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LAWYERING PARADOXES: MAKING MEANING OF THE CONTRADICTIONS 
 
Susan Sturm 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Effective lawyering requires the ability to manage contradictory yet interdependent practices. In 
their role as traditionally understood, lawyers must fight, judge, debate, minimize risk, and 
advance clients’ interests. Yet increasingly, lawyers must ALSO collaborate, build trust, 
innovate, enable effective risk-taking, and hold clients accountable for adhering to societal 
values. Law students and lawyers alike struggle, often unproductively, to reconcile these 
tensions. Law schools often address them as a dilemma requiring a choice or overlook the 
contradictions that interfere with their integration.  
 
This Article argues instead that these seemingly contradictory practices can be brought together 
through the theory and action of paradox. After identifying the features of these two practices of 
lawyering—called here legality and proactive lawyering—the Article sets out five lawyering 
paradoxes that stem from the opposing yet interdependent features of legalistic and proactive 
lawyering: paradoxes of thought and discourse; relationship; motivation, mindset, and justice. 
Next, the Article shows the consequences of legal education’s tendency to avoid, sidestep, or 
downplay these paradoxes. Finally, drawing on existing research and experiences of innovators, 
the Article identifies three strategies that can enable students and lawyers to construct a dynamic 
tension between legality and proactive lawyering, and in the process build the potential for 
transformative learning and meaningful justice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
From the moment I entered law school, and through four decades as a lawyer and 
then a law professor, I have experienced lawyering as a bundle of contradictions. Crossing 
the threshold into the legal world in the late 1970s, I found that my dream of paving the way 
for a new era of social justice ran headlong into the wall of austere tradition. This tension 
between purpose and precedent replayed daily in the classroom during my law school years. 
I often found myself frustrated and infuriated by case law and Socratic dialogue, which 
instructed that “thinking like a lawyer” meant looking backward rather than forward, 
following authority rather than pursuing innovation, and promoting predictability rather 
than solving problems. Nonetheless, I absorbed the message that, as lawyers, we would be 
expected to find solutions for the world’s most intractable problems. Alongside its 
constraining energy, the role of the lawyer would put me in positions requiring that I “think 
outside of the box.”  
In practice, I continued to grapple with these contradictions. Legal reasoning and 
adversary process proved simultaneously necessary and limiting, just as collaboration and 
problem solving got me only so far. As a litigator, I was continually buffeted by the need to 
fight while cooperating—as part of conducting discovery, orchestrating a trial, or settling a 
case. As an assistant to a master in a prison case, I witnessed the court’s power to force 
prison officials to pay attention to inhumane and abusive conditions that they had tolerated 
without consequence until the court intervened. Yet, the court could not induce the 
cooperation and commitment necessary for sustainable change; the force of law that put 
prison reform in the spotlight also triggered backlash and resistance that undercut its 
power.1  
Now, as a law professor, I experience these contradictions in my scholarship and 
teaching. In both arenas, I have explored concepts and strategies that move from mindsets of 
compliance to creative problem solving, from paradigms of gladiators to those of problem 
solvers.2 I have grappled with ways that courts can simultaneously serve as the backstop for 
enforcing prescriptions against first generation employment discrimination while creating 
the framework to encourage problem solving to address second generation discrimination.3 I 
have proposed ways to integrate problem solving approaches with judicial intervention, and 
yet I remain dissatisfied with the strategies proposed to reconcile or resolve the tensions  
between informal and collaborative modes of problem solving and more formal and 
compliance-based approaches. Those contradictions also surface in my current work to build 
the capacity of judges, clerks, and other employees throughout the court system to engage 
 
1 See Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 805 (1990); Note, “Mastering” Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L. J. 1062 (1979). 
2 See Susan Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy, 
and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 119 (1997)[hereinafter From Gladiators to 
Problem Solvers]; Susan Sturm, Reframing the Civil Rights Narrative: From Compliance to Collective Impact, in 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN STORY (Austin Sarat ed. 2014). 
3 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 
(2001). 
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openly and constructively with race, while also developing a robust compliance process that 
holds people accountable when they violate anti-discrimination rules.  
As a teacher, every year I witness many students struggling with the contradictions that 
buffeted me as a law student. I teach Civil Procedure alongside courses called Lawyering for 
Change and Lawyer Leadership: Leading Self, Leading Others, Leading Change. Each 
course aims to equip students with capacities fundamental to lawyers’ roles in enabling 
constructive human interaction. Yet, on their face, they seem to require opposing capacities, 
and to cultivate competing mindsets. Students experienced this disconnect firsthand during an 
exercise we conduct on the first day of class in Lawyer Leadership. We divide students into 
small groups and ask each group to list the qualities or descriptors that come to mind when they 
think of the words “law” and “lawyer.” We then ask them to do the same with the word 
“leadership” and “leader.” When we come back together, we ask students what they noticed 
about the “Law/Lawyer compared to the Leadership/Leader” lists generated by each group. 
Students typically describe lawyers as “competitive,” “aggressive,” “critical,” “adversarial,” 
“hard-working,” and “risk-averse.” In contrast, the column for leaders contains descriptors such 
as “creative,” “entrepreneurial,” “visionary,” “inspiring,” and “collaborative.” It doesn’t take 
long for an observant student to notice that there is virtually no overlap in their “lawyer” and 
“leader” descriptors.4 
These tensions have taken on particular urgency in the current political moment. Many 
are looking to law—and especially the judiciary—as the bulwark against the threat to rule-of-law 
values facing the United States and the larger world. At the same time, the legitimacy of those 
same institutions is under attack from the highest levels of government. Scholars and students are 
faced with the quandary of simultaneously relying on traditional legal institutions, while looking 
to political mobilization and community organizing that call into question the legitimacy of those 
core institutions. This requires finding ways to address some of the most vexing challenges 
facing law schools and the legal profession: How do you find and sustain meaning and 
imagination in the face of skepticism built into law’s methodology? How do you pursue justice 
through law if the legal system itself is, important respects, unjust? How do you equip law 
students and lawyers to navigate the competing call of power and purpose?  
I have come to realize that lawyers’ capacity for impact depends upon making sense of, 
and being able to forge constructive tension between these oppositional aspects of lawyering. 
These core roles and practices simultaneously contradict and depend on each other for the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of both. Lawyers play a key role in designing human interaction so 
that diverse people can peacefully and effectively govern themselves. They bear responsibility 
for helping individuals, organizations, and governments structure their affairs so they can live 
and work together, even when they disagree. They are called upon to be problem solvers and 
facilitators of human interaction. These informal and facilitative interactions take place in the 
shadow of background norms and rules developed by lawyers and legal institutions. When 
conflict erupts and relationships break down, law—through lawyers—enforces rules and enables 
 
4 This dichotomy between Law/Lawyer and leadership/Leader characterizes in legal practitioners’ conceptions as 
well. See ROBERT W. CULLEN, THE LEADING LAWYER: A GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW AND LEADERSHIP (2009) 
(reporting similar non-overlapping descriptors when seasoned lawyers asked to describe lawyering and leadership).  
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people to fight without resorting to violence, using adversarial tools to allocate responsibility, 
impose judgment, and enforce rules. Effective lawyers must both fight and collaborate, judge and 
build trust, debate and design new institutions, minimize risk and enable effective risk taking, 
advance clients’ values, and hold clients accountable for adhering to societal values.  
Progress has been made in incorporating what I call proactive lawyering into a 
curriculum organized around the logic of what I call legality. Although many law schools 
continue to be organized around legality’s logic of learning to “think like a lawyer”,5 in recent 
years law schools have expanded offerings cultivating proactive lawyering, including clinical 
legal education, added experiential learning requirements, and introduced interdisciplinary 
offerings and courses focused on problem solving, deal making, and alternative dispute 
resolution.6 Some doctrinal teachers incorporate critical methodologies into their teaching, and 
experiment with experiential pedagogy in the conventional law school classroom. Most recently, 
law schools, including my own, have focused explicit attention on cultivating lawyer-leadership 
skills.7  
Notwithstanding these developments, most law schools have yet to come to terms with 
how to prepare students--and the legal profession--to navigate the tensions between legality and 
proactive lawyering.8 They have tended to avoid, sidestep, or downplay the tendency of legality 
to crowd out proactive lawyering, and of legal education to undercut efforts to forge a dynamic 
tension with the transformative potential. The prevailing strategy for promoting the capacity to 
navigate these opposing aspects of lawyering could be called “add and stir.” Much of the 
literature either explicitly or implicitly assumes that proactive lawyering can be added into the 
law school curriculum as supplements or complementary competencies. A case in point is a 
report urging that lawyers “be equipped with a broad range of ‘complementary competencies’ 
that supplement and expand the ‘core’ competencies of legal reasoning and analysis that have 
been traditionally taught in law school and emphasized in legal practice.”9  
The complementarity argument goes something like this: The current law school 
curriculum (and the accompanying pedagogy) emphasizing the development of legal analytical 
skills remains valid, and should remain at the center of the law school curriculum and pedagogy. 
It is, however, too narrow. It does not adequately equip students to navigate the array of 
challenges they will face in their multiple roles, to take up the leadership that society calls upon 
lawyers to exercise, and to do so at a time of increasing volatility, complexity, and urgency. 
 
5 See Section I(A), infra. 
6 See Section I(B), infra.  
7 As of March, 2019, more than 50 law schools reported having some type of leadership programming and/or 
courses. Leah Teague, A Message from the Chair-2019, (Mar. 8, 2019), https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/, 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019). 
8 There are law schools that have faced this challenge head on as part of their creation, such as CUNY Law School, 
Northeastern Law School, and more recently, University of California at Irvine. See CUNY LAW SCHOOL, 
https://www.law.cuny.edu/about/history/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2019); ABOUT UCI LAW, 
https://www.law.uci.edu/about/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).  
9 BEN W. HEINEMAN, WILLIAM F. LEE, AND DAVID B. WILKINS,  LAWYERS AS PROFESSIONALS AND AS CITIZENS: 
KEY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, https://clp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Professionalism-Project-
Essay_11.20.14.pdf. 
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Proactive lawyering can be added to the prevailing pedagogy to meet these needs because the 
skills associated with learning leadership are compatible with, or at least not opposed to, those 
involved in learning how to “think like a lawyer” in the traditional sense of what that means. 
Proactive lawyering thus can and should simply be added onto learning to operate in lawyers’ 
more conventional adjudicatory roles. 
This simple strategy of complementarity will not, in my view, work. It sidesteps 
fundamental ways that legal education geared toward cultivating conventional legal skills— 
“legality” in my sense—necessarily operates in tension with—and sometimes in opposition to—
the kind of learning and practice that must take place for lawyers to perform the facilitative and 
problem solving roles they also occupy. Much of the literature promoting proactive lawyering 
treats the capacities and mindsets celebrated in the Socratic classroom—judgment, 
categorization, critique, risk minimization, and reasoning from precedent—as limitations to be 
overcome or minimized. Perhaps most fundamentally, the notions of justice embraced by legality 
as opposed to proactive lawyering directly collide, and are often difficult to reconcile.10 The 
tendency to downplay these tensions and contradictions—or to throw up one’s hands in the face 
of them—underappreciates both the necessity and opportunity presented by naming and 
engaging them. Unless these tensions are addressed, features of legal education operating within 
the conventional paradigm are likely to marginalize and undercut the efforts to build lawyers’ 
leadership capacities.  
I have come to believe that the concept of paradox holds a key to navigating these 
contradictory yet linked aspects of lawyering. A paradox is a statement or proposition with 
positions that are conflicting and yet both are true.11 Paradoxes involve struggle because they call 
upon mentalities or practices that tend to interfere with each other, even as they depend upon 
each other. A growing body of organizational and change literature offers insights into both how 
paradoxes operate and how they can operate virtuously rather than as a vicious cycle.12 By 
definition, paradoxes cannot be resolved or eliminated; their self-referential and cycling quality 
is what makes them a paradox.  
In key respects, the paradoxical elements of lawyering are built into law’s structure, role, 
and practice. At the level of structure, formal and informal constitutions (such as contracts) set 
up law both to provide structures and processes enabling people to interact, cooperate, and make 
decisions, on the one hand, and to enable people to fight without violence and to abide by 
decisions that will be backed by force, on the other. Lawyers sit at the cusp of these paradoxical 
functions.13  
 
10 See Section II(E), infra.  
11 KENWYN K. SMITH AND DAVID N. BERG, PARADOXES OF GROUP LIFE (1987); PETER ELBOW, EMBRACING 
CONTRARIES: EXPLORATIONS IN LEARNING AND TEACHING 330 (1986).  
12 See Section IB, infra.  
13 Robert Cover brilliantly portrayed these dualities as a defining feature of law:  
 
Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of a reality to an imagined 
alternative - that is, as a connective between two states of affairs, both of which can be represented in their 
normative significance only through the devices of narrative. 
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These tensions also inhere at the level of role. Lawyers are called upon to build, design, 
enable cooperation and collaboration, “constitute” governments, contracts, relationships, and 
transactions (in the constitution, in deals, in house, and in alternative dispute resolution), solve 
problems, and facilitate wise decision-making. They must simultaneously be ready to fight on 
behalf of clients, to be the stewards of the adversary process, and to discipline the exercise of the 
violence of the state. These roles are in tension. They are also interdependent. Lawyers cannot 
conduct a trial without both cooperating and fighting. They cannot steward an effective deal 
without both minimizing and facilitating risk taking.  
Finally, the practices required for effective lawyering are themselves paradoxical. 
Conventional lawyering and leadership will sometimes require competing mindsets, skills, and 
practices. Lawyers have to judge while they also listen, enable, and empathize. They have to 
create the conditions for growth and learning, even as they set up the processes to locate or cabin 
legal responsibility. They have to be in a creative mindset even as they facilitate compliance and 
reactive risk avoidance.  
The tensions that manifest in the relationship between legality and proactive lawyering lie 
at the heart of what makes lawyers distinctive, necessary, and effective. The most successful and 
impactful lawyers live in these tensions. The role of law and lawyers fundamentally involves the 
capacity to combine these contradictory modes of thinking, acting, and interacting. This capacity 
to hold paradox may be what equips lawyers to exercise truly effective leadership.14 It matters 
both for lawyers in more conventional roles, and for those who, over the course of their careers, 
will occupy formal leadership roles in the public, private, and non-profit sectors.15 When lawyers 
without this capacity occupy leadership roles, that deficit may help us understand the spectacular 
failures that unfold when they get stuck on one side or the other of the paradox. The challenge 
facing law schools is to figure out how to build that tension—and the capacity to manage it—into 
their practices and cultures. Law school can have a profound impact on how lawyers approach 
the paradoxical aspects of their roles. It offers a unique opportunity to forge a dynamic 
relationship between legality and proactive lawyering.  
 
 
Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
 
14 See ROBERT J. ANDERSON AND WILLIAM A. ADAMS, MASTERING LEADERSHIP: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR 
BREAKTHROUGH PERFORMANCE AND EXTRAORDINARY BUSINESS RESULTS 82 (2016)(“The ability to hold opposites, 
conflict, tension, and polarity, without avoiding them, over-simplifying them or resorting to quick fixes is the 
hallmark of leadership.”). 
15 DEBORAH L. RHODE AND AMANDA K. PACKEL, LEADERSHIP FOR LAWYERS 3 (2018) (“The most crucial 
challenges of our times involve issues of leadership and, in the United States, no occupation is more responsible for 
producing leaders than that of law. The legal profession has supplied a majority of American presidents and, in 
recent decades, almost half the members of Congress. Although they account for just 0.4 percent of the population, 
lawyers are well represented at all levels of leadership, as governors, state legislators, judges, prosecutors, general 
counsel, law firm managing partners, and heads of corporate, government, and nonprofit organizations.”) Rhode also 
notes that “Americans place lawyers in leadership positions in much higher percentages than other countries.” 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 3 (2013).  
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This Article argues for naming legality’s dualities, reframing them as paradoxes, 
embracing those paradoxes as challenging but necessary, and engaging law schools and the legal 
profession in building capacity to navigate these contradictory yet interdependent requirements. 
Section I lays out the contrary yet interdependent features of legality and proactive lawyering.. 
Section II explores what makes those tensions paradoxical. This Section identify five paradoxes 
of lawyer leadership—dualities that contradict one another, give rise to, and affect how lawyers 
will experience leadership learning: paradoxes of thought and discourse; relationship; 
motivation, mindset, and justice. Section III shows the limitations of prevailing strategies for 
reconciling the contradictions between legality and proactive lawyering. Finally, drawing on 
action research and the literature of paradox and organizational change, Section IV offers three 
strategies for enabling law students, law schools, and legal organizations to hold contradictory 
messages and mindsets, and for using this paradoxical approach to strengthen and deepen 
leadership capacity in lawyers. 
 
I. DEFINING THE DUALITY 
 
The central argument of this Article is that lawyering entails contradictory yet 
interdependent features and practices, and that explicit attention to these tensions matters. I have 
identified two constellations of activities that employ different and, in some respects, opposing 
logic. Before we can explore the duality’s paradoxical nature, we must first define its two sides.  
Legality makes up one side of this duality. Although there is considerable disagreement 
about what “thinking like a lawyer” should mean, legality in the conventional sense has a set of 
common features. The other side of the duality falls under the umbrella of what I call proactive 
lawyering. Housed under this rubric include lawyering situations featuring ways of thinking, 
interacting, and practicing that operate in tension with legality.  
Section A identifies and briefly describes three defining attributes of legality: formality, 
authority, and adversarialism. These pillars of legality’s logic also anchor the contradictions built 
into to legal education and lawyering. Section B first identifies the forms of practice falling 
under the rubric of “proactive lawyering, and then identifies the features that operate alongside 
and, in certain respects, in tension with legality in both the law school curriculum and legal 
practice.  
 
A. Lawyering’s Default Paradigm: Adjudicatory Lawyering and the Rule of Law 
Legality—a synonym for the rule of law—lies at the heart of conventional legal 
education and of law’s claim to legitimacy.16  Law school initiates students to the legal 
 
16 I am using “legality” as a descriptive rather than evaluative term, to connote the modes of reasoning and decision 
making that characterize widely shared features that define what it means to operate under the rule of law. I am in 
good company in using the term “legality” in this manner See, e.g., Lauren Edelman, Legality and the Endogeneity 
of Law, in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK (Robert A. Kagan et al 
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profession by schooling them in a distinctive mode of thinking, relating, and motivating action, 
which has come to define what it means to “think like a lawyer.” This is conventionally 
conceived to mean engaging in formal, adversarial modes of argumentation and decision-
making, governed by precedent and backed by sanctions.17 The first year curriculum focuses 
primarily on teaching students legal reasoning, argumentation, and decision-making as the 
operating system for the rule of law, which functions as lawyers’ default mode of thinking and 
acting. For many lawyers and commentators, traditional legal method and analysis “should 
continue to be at the core of legal education, as well as of any plausible professional licensing 
regime.”18  
Legality is not limited to adjudication, though the judiciary is the paradigmatic institution 
generating its features. Often, students are introduced to administrative, legislative, or 
transactional activity by reading appellate decisions assessing the adequacy of decisions by non-
adjudicative institutions, and by applying an adversarial mode of inquiry to analyzing the work 
of these institutions. Many scholars of administrative decision making, remedies, legislation, and 
organizations have embraced rule of law values as a pathway to legitimacy, paved by lawyers 
deploying the processes and analytical tools forged in the judiciary.19 Organizations operating 
out of but governed by legal institutions also adopt legality as a way to enhance their 
legitimacy.20 Legality frames many lawyers’ approaches to representing organizational clients.21 
It provides the stamp of legitimacy associated with the rule of law.  
The literature analyzing what it means to “think like a lawyer”—and how legal education 
teaches the mastery of adjudicatory lawyering—focuses on three defining features: formality, 
authority, and adversarialism. These features combine to structure how law students, particularly 
in their first year, learn to reason, communicate, interact, and orient their learning.22 Together 
 
eds 2002); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961):  PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 
(1969). 
17 See HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, supra note XX, at 9; ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: 
LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER,” (2007); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2009); PHILIP 
SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Todd D. Rakoff and Martha Minow, A Case for 
Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597,608 (2007).  
18 HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, supra note XX, at 13 (“The special work of law is to identify claims and 
obligations that merit official validation and enforcement.”). The MacCrate Report, intended to spark curricular 
reform in legal education, states that “law schools should continue to emphasize the teaching of "legal analysis and 
reasoning," and "legal research". American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 
Legal Education and Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law 
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (Chicago, 1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]. 
19 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 149 (2008); Jonathan Gould, Making Parliamentary 
Precedent (unpublished manuscript)(on file with author); Sarah A. Seo, Democratic Policing Before the Due 
Process Revolution, 128 YALE L. J. 1 (2019). 
20 Edelman, supra note XX; Sim B. Sitkin and Robert J. Bies, The Legalistic Organization: Definitions, Dimensions, 
and Dilemmas, 4 ORG. SCI., 345 (1993). 
21 Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 259, 273 (1990) 
(discussing the inadequacy of the partisan role of lawyers in fulfilling the public oriented mission of the profession 
that justifies the adversary system in the first place). 
22 See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007); Bryant 
Garth and Yves Dezelay, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993); Susan 
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they operate as “a now canonical practice of legal analysis”,23 an operating system that orients 
many students’ professional identity as lawyers. These pillars of legality’s logic also anchor the 
contradictions built into to legal education and lawyering.  
 
1. Formality 
Formality is one of legality’s most visible and defining features. The actors operating 
within the legal system occupy formal roles that define their authority and structure their 
relationships (lawyer, client, judge, legislator, administrator etc.). Professional and legal norms 
dictate how people in different legal positions communicate and relate to each other. For law 
students, the legal acculturation process begins by experiencing the formality of space, language, 
relationships, and ways of thinking in the classroom and the law school culture.24 People refer to 
each other by role (Judge, Professor) and their interactions often take place in venues that 
structure the form and boundaries of interaction among the participants in the adversary process. 
The relationships of professor and student, lawyer and client, judge and litigant operate within a 
ritualized structure with a prescribed form.25 Learning the law involves becoming acculturated to 
these formal rules and practices.26  
Formality also prescribes the prevailing mode of thought for judges, lawyers, and law 
students. Legal reasoning—reasoning analogically, formally, and from precedent—is “what 
distinguishes lawyers from other sorts of folk.”27 Legal norms “characteristically satisfy certain 
formal conditions—such as generality—which are usually taken to be necessary conditions also 
for justice.”28 Legal reasoning proceeds by identifying the relevant legal categories and placing 
people’s conduct into those categories. In this sense, formality operates as defining feature of 
“the rule of law”: “to move from a non-legal to a legal mode of governance is to move to a 
situation where there will be special and explicit concern for treating like cases alike, for 
universalization, and for proceeding in a rule like manner.”29 Although legal analysis has moved 
beyond formalism, formality continues to remain alive in legal thought, with its emphasis on 
predictability, uniformity of treatment, reasoning from precedent, and transparency.30 
 
 
Sturm and Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and 
Conformity, 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 515 (2007). 
23 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 36 (1996). 
24 MERTZ, supra  note ; Schauer, supra note , Sturm and Guinier, supra note .  
25 MacCrate Report, supra note XX. 
26 Mertz documents the socialization process that takes place in the law school classrooms she studied, and the 
cumulative impact of those interactions on students’ view of law and lawyering. See MERTZ, supra note.  
27 SCHAUER, supra note, at 1.  
28 Jeremy Waldon, Does Law Promise Justice? in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF 
PHILIP SELZNICK 110 (Robert A. Kagan, Martin Krygier, and Kenneth Winston eds 2002). 
29 Id. 
30 SCHAUER, supra note XX, at 24. 
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2. Legitimacy grounded in authority 
Legality prioritizes rule-based decision-making, precedent, and reliance on authority as 
the source of law.31 “A legal system is known by the existence of authoritative rules.”32 
Argumentation and decision making proceed by reasoning from precedent and authority—
essentially backward-looking analytical and logical analysis assessing whether the conduct falls 
within the scope of an authoritative legal rule or principle. Decisions turn on the dictates of 
written-down rules, applied in new situations. Individual judgment operates under the constraint 
of precedent. “It is the precedent’s source or status that gives it force, not the soundness of its 
reasoning nor the belief of the instant court that its outcome was correct.”33  
Law students and lawyers are socialized to value this mode of thought as fundamental to 
what it means to “think like a lawyer.” Students learn to support their arguments for how a case 
should turn out with authority and reasoning by analogy to precedent, rather than with what they 
think is right or just, might improve the situation, or produce a better outcome. This form of 
reasoning is counter-intuitive; it dictates, “[o]utcomes other than those the decision-maker would 
otherwise seem to be the best all-things-considered outcome for the case at hand.”34   
Authority operates within legality in a second important respect: as a way to enforce 
compliance with legal norms. A distinguishing feature of law is its relationship to state-
sanctioned violence. Legality relies ultimately on the power of the state to enforce norms, and 
thus to motivate behavior. Legal actors achieve adherence through the imposition of legal 
requirements, the expression of legal duties to comply with those responsibilities, threats of 
negative consequences for failing to adhere, and when necessary, coercion. The motivation for 
adhering to norms is basically extrinsic, in the form of duty, incentives, threats, and coercion.35    
Both of these aspects of authority relate to one crucial function of law: as Larry 
Alexander and Frederick Schauer have written, “an important--perhaps the important--function 
of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done.”36 In Philip Selznick’s words, “the 
special work of law is to identify claims and obligations that merit official validation and 
enforcement.”37   
 
 
31 Id. at 5, EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal 
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836 (1990).  
32 SELZNICK, supra note  , at 5. 
33 Id. at 41.  
34 SCHAUER, supra note , at 7-8. 
35 See Cover, supra note XX, at ; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule 
Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 42 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Eds. 
2006)(“The American legal system stands ready to commit vast resources to the determination and evaluation of 
past conduct in order to calibrate present reward or punishment to it”); MALCOM K. SPARROW, IMPOSING DUTIES: 
GOVERNMENT’S CHANGING APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE 1 (1994). 
36 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, supra note XX.  
37 SELZNICK, supra note at 5.  
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3. Adversarialism 
 
A third defining feature of legality is adversarialism: two opposing sides put their best 
arguments forward, enabling a neutral decision maker to reach a correct decision based on the 
merits of those arguments.38 Adversarialism constructs conflict as a contest between competing 
positions. Each situation has two opposing sides, and the process will produce a winner and a 
loser. Within the adversary model, lawyers are understood to have a fiduciary duty to advance 
the interests and improving the situation of one party as against the interests of the opposing 
party.39 Lawyers’ ethical responsibilities to their clients stem from commitment to the adversary 
system, incarnated in the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.40  
From the outset, students learn that the adversary process is the gold standard for the rule 
of law. In the conventional law school classroom, adversarial conflict provides the underlying 
framework of interaction, knowledge generation, and problem solving. As presented in most law 
school classes, law addresses conflict in highly formal settings aimed at determining winners and 
losers. Problems are converted into binary options, and they are “resolved” by using authority 
and rigorous analysis to test the strength of those options. Competition functions to establish 
truth. The adversary process and rank ordering define success as winning that competition—in 
class, in an argument, in the courtroom, or elsewhere. 
The conventional law school classroom mirrors adjudication’s adversarial, formal idea of 
conflict. The professor structures interactions with students by invoking the style of an appellate 
judge who questions lawyers representing one side or the other to ferret out the weaknesses in 
their positions and validate winning arguments.41  
The adversary process holds a special place in the prevailing professional and public 
understanding of what it means to be governed by the rule of law.42 Felix Frankfurter’s oft-cited 
quote from Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath conveys the essence of the commitment to 
adversarialism as a hallmark of legality: “No better instrument has been devised for arriving at 
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of a serious loss notice of the case against him and 
 
38 For a discussion of the origins and operation adversary process in American Law, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE (2017); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A 
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984). For a summary of critiques, see Carrie Menkel Meadow, The Trouble With the 
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).  
39 Id.; Gilson and Mnookin, supra note , at 551 (“In the litigation context, the client's preferred position is given 
shape through the norm of zealous advocacy: the lawyer must vigorously assert the client's interests; the final 
authority on important issues of strategy rests with the client; and the client may discharge his lawyer at will, but the 
lawyer has only limited ability to withdraw from representation.”);  Geoffrey Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation; 38 
VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2004). 
40 William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic Perspectives, 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (2010). 
41 See MERTZ, supra note XX; SCHAUER, supra note XX. 
42 See id; sources cited in note XX, supra.  
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opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important 
to a popular government, that justice has been done.’’43  
 Legality’s defining features—formality, authority, and adversarialism—orient students 
to the legal profession and shape how many in the legal profession understand what it means to 
“think like a lawyer.” Legality casts a shadow over non-adjudicatory aspects of lawyering, such 
as negotiations and client counseling.44 These defining features also figure prominently in the 
popular understanding of law and lawyering.45 In conventional pedagogy, jurisprudence, and 
scholarship, legality is often contrasted with other modes of thought and decision making—
politics, personal preferences, bargaining, mediating, organizing, managing—as a way of 
differentiating law from other modes of decision making, and aspiring to make good on 
legality’s promises of predictability, generality of understanding and application, legitimacy, and 
order.46  
Though legality has endured as the default logic in most law schools, it has been the 
focus of waves of critique by legal scholars, educational reformers, and students.47  Legal realists 
criticized the court-centered and formalistic focus of legality, both in practice and in legal 
education, and sought to widen or shift the focus to include systematic empirical study, 
sociological jurisprudence and the legislative realm.48 Critical legal scholars, critical race 
theorists, and feminist theorists have challenged basic assumptions underlying legality–that 
politics could be separated from law, that law operates neutrally, and that legal doctrine rather 
than power and ideology dictates judicial outcomes.49 Commentators have criticized legality for 
its disconnection from practice and its failure to prepare students for the full array of 
competencies required for effective lawyering. Legality conveys an overly narrow idea of 
lawyers’ roles, if it addresses lawyering at all. These critiques have prompted the introduction of 
courses that extend beyond legality, with features quite different from those called for by 
legality.  
 
43 341 U.S. 123, 171-72(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
44 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); 
ROBERT MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET, AND ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE 
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000). 
45 Miriam Webster’s definition of law embodies legality’s features:  
 
Law is a binding custom or practice of a community; a rule or mode of conduct or action that is prescribed 
or formally recognized as binding by a supreme controlling authority or is made obligatory by a 
sanction (as an edict, decree, rescript, order, ordinance, statute, resolution, rule, judicial decision, or usage) 
made, recognized, or enforced by the controlling authority. 
 
46 See UNGER, supra note , at 65. Roberto Unger eloquently summarizes this animating idea of contemporary law 
and legal doctrine “as a binary system of rights of choice and of arrangements withdrawn from choice the better to 
make the exercise of choice real and effective.” Id. at 27. 
47 I am indebted to Jed Purdy for this way of organizing the critique of legality.  
48 SEE JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 161-62 (1949); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
831 (2008).The realist critique is summarized in SCHAUER, supra note XX, at 124-34. 
49 DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY (1983); UNGER, supra, note XX. 
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B. Legality’s Duality: Proactive Lawyering  
Although legality has maintained its canonical status in legal education, lawyers and 
academics alike recognize that law and lawyering also entail ways of thinking, relating, and 
practicing that do not conform to legality’s conventions. Though these practices occur in 
different venues, they share features requiring overlapping competencies and roles that can be 
cultivated systematically if they are recognized as part of the same field of practice. These 
lawyering practices also bear a similar relationship to legality:  they both conflict with legality’s 
defining features and are integrally linked with legality’s operation.  
This Article uses the term “proactive lawyering” as the umbrella for the full range of 
lawyering activities that involve taking the steps needed to meet needs, address problems, and 
achieve goals.50  Proactive means “acting in anticipation of future problems, needs, or changes.” 
I also use “proactive” as an acronym, to convey the range of roles and practices that lawyers 
engage in that share these features: 
 
P R O A C T I V E 
Problem 
solver 
 
Researcher 
Reflective 
practitioner 
 
Observer Advisor 
 
Counselor 
Capacity 
builder 
Change 
agent 
Translator 
Transaction 
engineer 
 
 
Intermediary 
Institutional 
designer 
Information 
integrator 
Values 
maximizer 
Enabler 
Educator 
Ethicist 
 
This section first catalogues the domains that regularly employ proactive lawyering. It 
then identifies three features that characterize proactive lawyering: informality, a focus on 
efficacy, and collaboration.  
 
1. A map of proactive lawyering domains 
 
Proactive lawyering currently operates in a variety of domains falling both within and 
beyond conventional legal practice.  
 
 
50 Other options that have been proposed as an umbrella term include problem solving, holistic lawyering, 
professionalism, lawyer leadership. For a discussion of the limitations of these alternatives and relationship of 
proactive lawyering to lawyer leadership, see Susan Sturm, Leadership by Any Other Name (work in progress).  
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a. Policy analysis built into legal decision making 
Even within legal doctrinal analysis, modes of thinking beyond conventionally defined 
legality come into play. As legal theorists and critics have noted, classic legal reasoning 
(meaning using logic, analysis, analogy, and precedent to decide cases) cannot actually resolve 
cases where the legal rule is ambiguous, the situation is complex, and competing policies dictate 
different outcomes. Where there is no clear rule or applicable precedent, courts and lawyers must 
grapple with competing values.51 Some mode of decision-making beyond logic and analogy is 
needed to select among these competing values.52   
Commentators and critics have pointed out contradictions between conventional legal 
reasoning and the methodology needed to grapple effectively with conflicting values and policies 
in the context of judicial decision making.53 At a more basic level, law in the more formal sense 
takes on its meaning through communal narratives, even as though norms are nurtured outside 
law and may be undermined by official legal rules and the processes that enforce them.54  
 
b. Aspects of adjudication requiring practices beyond legality 
Although legality structures the logic of analysis and decision making in adjudication, the 
processes required for adjudication to occur, as well as for giving force to resulting judgments, 
cannot proceed only through legality. They require more collaborative, informal, and facilitative 
modes of thought, interaction, and practice. Interactions with the client leading up to litigation 
involve advising, counseling, and fact gathering.55  Discovery and trial preparation also 
contemplates non-adversarial, forward-looking interactions with opposing counsel, experts, and 
potential witnesses. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demand that lawyers work 
together at every critical juncture of litigation.56 The rules, along with mutual self-interest, also 
yield incentives and processes to induce settlement.57 Indeed, most cases settle, meaning that 
even for litigators, lawyers will spend much of their time involved in informal interactions aimed 
at achieving effective resolution, which in turn requires cooperation with client and adversary.58  
Remedies, particularly injunctive remedies, also call upon courts and lawyers to construct 
forward-looking solutions that can effectively address legal violations.59 
 
51UNGAR, supra note XX; Dorf, supra note XX.  
52 See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 10-11 (2005) (quoted in Robert Post and Reva 
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash 42 HARV. CIV. R. CIV. LIB. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
53 UNGER, supra note , at 42. 
54 Cover, supra note XX; Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L, J, 1860, 1866 
(1987). 
55 DAVID A. BINDER, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS (1991). 
56 See, e,g. F.R.C.P. Rules 16, 26, 37, 68.  
57 Gilson and Mnookin, at 516. 
58 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 
3 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459–570 (2004). 
59 Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies; Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts; 
Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 Colum. J. European L. (2007). 
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c. Non-legalistic judicial arenas  
A panoply of judicial arenas—some old and some new—operate with a logic that emphasizes 
problem solving and conflict resolution, and do not conform in significant respects to the pillars 
of legality envisioned by the first-year curriculum. Family court,60 juvenile court, problem 
solving courts61 (such as drug courts and homelessness courts), and bankruptcy courts all depart 
significantly from legality’s modus operandi.62 They use informal processes. Their focus is on 
problem solving and remediation. Their method relies heavily on collaboration and strives to 
minimize adversarialism. In addition, many litigants proceed pro se; many court systems have 
adapted their roles and practices to adapt to this reality, often in ways that do not hew closely to 
the demands of legality.63  
 
d. Non-adjudicative legal practice  
Alongside their roles in processing adversary conflict, law and lawyers are called upon to 
structure and facilitate human interactions enabling individuals, groups, communities, and 
polities to achieve shared goals, produce value, and solve problems. Many aspects of legal 
practice operate outside of the confines of the legality framework, and require different mindsets, 
competencies, and practices. Alternative dispute resolution takes place both in the shadow of the 
law and outside the formal legal system.64 Mediation and negotiation are a mainstay of legal 
practice. These processes and practices come into play both as an explicit form of conflict 
resolution and in the process of everyday interactions with clients, collaborators, and adversaries.  
Lawyers also are engaged in problem solving as a crucial aspect of their counseling, 
facilitation, advising, and intermediary roles.65 They help clients, organizations, communities, 
 
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1015, 1055 (2004). 
60 ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF 
CUSTODY 52-54 (1992). 
61 Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 831 (2000); Judith Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are 
Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851 (1997). 
62 Amy J. Cohen, Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL 91, 100-101 (2011).  
63 Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the New Civil Courts, 2018 
WISC. L. REV. 249 (2018).  
64 See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2005); 
MNOOKIN, PEPPET, AND TULUMELLO, supra note XX; THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR 
THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 616 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Chistopher Honeyman, eds. 2006). 
65 PAUL BREST AND LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL 
JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2010); Carrie Menkel-eadow, The Lawyer as Problem 
Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and NonPartisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 793–94 
(1999); Sturm, supra note XX, at XX. 
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and systems address problems in the classic sense (an issue that requires resolution) as well as 
problems in the sense of something that has gone awry and requires remediation.  
Transactional lawyering and lawyers representing organizations certainly employ legality as 
part of their practice, but their roles and relationships are much more facilitative and oriented 
toward enabling clients to achieve their aims. 66 They add value by sharing non-legal knowledge, 
facilitating collaboration, serving as intermediaries, building trust, problem solving, and 
designing systems of mutual accountability and problem solving. All of these aspects of 
transactional lawyering call for informal, constructive, integrative, and forward-looking modes 
of thinking, relating, and motivating practice. Lawyers representing organizations (both for-
profit and non-profit) operate both inside and outside the legality frame, using mindsets and 
strategies focused on enabling the organization to achieve its goals while minimizing legal risk.67  
Human rights practice is another area that calls upon lawyers to play roles beyond legality. 
Core human rights practices call for changing norms and practices through political mobilization 
and building the capacity of directly affected communities to advocate on their own behalf.68 
Human rights practice thus rests upon multidimensional lawyering, using informal norms, 
building alliances, marshaling public opinion, building the capacity of directly affected 
communities to advocate on their own behalf, and marshalling informal incentives and tools to 
hold individuals, corporations, and governments accountable, realize rights, and advance change.  
Movement lawyering and social change lawyering increasingly involves these multi-
dimensional strategies and roles, operating alongside side law reform and litigation strategies. 69 
Although litigation continues to play a central role in social change work, lawyers and legal 
scholars utilize an array of methods, with litigation embedded in a broader theory of change 
aimed at having impact.  
 
e. New forms and institutions of legal decision making 
Finally, law and lawyering practices and roles are adapting to the demands of highly 
complex, uncertain, and troubled times by forging new forms that can accommodate volatility, 
complexity, and uncertainty. These forms recognize the limits of conventional legality as a way 
to address complex problems, and emphasize the development of institutional architecture that 
supports collaboration, peer-to-peer learning, experimentation, and adaptability. Legality’s limits 
 
66 Gilson and Mnookin, supra.  
67 See BJARNE P. TELLMANN, BUILDING AND OUTSTANDING LEGAL TEAM: BATTLE TESTED STRATEGIES FROM A 
GENERAL COUNSEL 254-68 (2017). 
68 JO BECKER, CAMPAIGNING FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE (2013); TRICIA CORNELL, KATE 
KELSCH, NICOLE PALASZ, NEW TACTICS IN HUMAN RIGHTS (2004). 
69 Suzanne Goldberg, Multidimensional Advocacy as Applied: Marriage Equality and Reproductive Rights, 29 
Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 7 (2015); Austin, Chu, and Liebman, supra note XX.  
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have also prompted some scholars to call for an expansion of what we mean by legality to 
include institutional reimagination and redesign.70  
Some of this work focuses on expanding or rethinking the role of the judiciary, to operate in 
dynamic relationship with other institutional actors that develop effective modes of problem 
solving and innovation.71 Some focuses on linking informal dispute resolution and problem 
solving with the process of generating public norms.72 Some focuses on constructing and linking 
intermediary institutions and “organizational catalysts” that will spur on going learning, mutual 
accountability, and adaptive norms.73 These new forms, emerging in both theory and practice, 
call for more collaborative, creative, and learning-focused modes of law and lawyering.  
 
2. Proactive lawyering’s defining features 
 
The lawyering practices discussed in the previous section share important attributes. They 
are all aimed at enabling individuals, groups, and institutions to achieve their goals and 
aspirations in a world shaped but not fully defined by law.  
This section describes three key features of proactive lawyering practices and roles: (1) 
informality, (2) legitimacy grounded in efficacy, and (3) collaboration. Each of these modes of 
practice operates in tension with a core feature of legality.  
 
a. Informality 
 Proactive lawyering contrasts with legality in its emphasis on informality. It does not 
proceed according to fixed roles and rules. Roles are defined functionally rather than formally. 
These processes call for flexibility and adaptability in both roles and mode of thinking, and the 
capacity to tailor the mode of reasoning and relationship to the demands of the situation. 
Stakeholders participate directly rather than only through an intermediary. These modes of 
thought and action emphasize adaptability rather than adherence to established procedure. The 
modes of interaction are designed to encourage relationships that foster trust and connection. 
Whereas legality calls for prescribed modes of interaction and relationships defined by roles, 
non-legalistic processes rely on effective communication, experimentation, and interactions that 
 
70 See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998); Minow and 
Rakoff, supra note XX. 
71 See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1055 (2004); Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts; Rethinking the Judicial Role 
in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUROPEAN L. (2007). 
72 Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 
523 (2008); Susan Sturm and Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP.RESOL. 1. 
73 Grainne De Burca and Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law, and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 2-3 (Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott, ed. 2006); Susan Sturm, The 
Architecture of Inclusion, Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 287 
(2006). 
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build understanding, learning, and capacity to work together. Participation is defined not by 
formal status (party, attorney of record, judge) but by the stake an individual might have in 
addressing an issue and their power to affect the desired outcome (either positively or 
negatively). Structure serves the role of facilitating purposeful and effective informal interaction 
rather than prescribing the modes of interaction and decision-making.  
 
b. Legitimacy grounded in efficacy 
Proactive lawyering strives for efficacy—the ability to produce a desired or intended result, to 
enable problem solving and the achievement of goals. The gaze is forward looking rather than 
backward looking, and focused on impact rather than predictability.74 Problem solving is integral 
to integral to proactive lawyering;75 it requires facilitating a process of understanding, specifying, 
diagnosing, and seeking to achieve the desired state.76  This role corresponds to Robert Cover’s 
capacious definition of law as the relationship between the “is”, the “ought” and the “what might 
be.”77   
Proactive lawyering’s inquiry is exploratory rather than adjudicative: how can the lawyer 
or decision maker facilitate the achievement of goals and the furtherance of purposes? What will 
it take to effectuate the desired outcome? What actually will work to address the problem, rather 
than what category or legal significance does this problem involve?78 This mode of engagement 
relies on creativity, innovation, imagination, and the strategic use of information to craft 
effective solutions and resolutions that satisfy the participants and meet the demands of the 
situation. 79 Power stems not from authority and the capacity to enlist coercion, but instead from 
influence, persuasiveness, and demonstrated capacity to achieve desired outcomes.80 
Globalization, technology, and complexity have amplified the importance of this focus on 
efficacy.81   
 
c. Collaboration  
 
74 Simon, supra note XX, at .  
75 Problem solving is the first skill identified in the MacCrate Report setting out key lawyering competencies. 
MacCrate Report, supra note XX. 
76 Paul Brest and Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 811, 812 (1999).  
77 Cover, supra note .  
78 Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984). 
79MacCrate Report, supra note XX, at 152. 
80 See IAN AYRES AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 110-116 (1992);  
81 See KIMBERLY AUSTIN, ELIZABETH CHU, AND JAMES LIEBMAN, RE-ENVISIONING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
(2017). Available at 
https://cprl.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/reenvisioning_professional_education_03142017_whit
e_paper_1.pdf, (last visited on August 15, 2019). 
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Proactive lawyering prioritizes collaboration. Its success depends on enabling people 
affected by, interested in, and responsible for an issue to work together, even across competing 
interests and opposing positions.82 Processes like learning from failure, deliberation, 
experimentation, design thinking, problem solving, and innovation get their power from bringing 
diverse perspectives together to learn with and from each other. They call for engaging with 
difference not as a way to evaluate the merits of each, but instead to enable effective learning 
from peers, adversaries, and outsiders, and interacting that enables creative solutions and 
effective implementation. Trust is a necessary lubricant of these interactions.83 
 
These three features of proactive lawyering described above form a logic that operates in tension 
with that of legality. Legality’s dualities are summarized below: 
 
 
 
 
Adjudicatory Lawyering Proactive Lawyering 
Formality Informality 
Authority    Efficacy 
Adversarialism Collaboration 
 
 
II. WHAT MAKES LAWYERING PARADOXICAL? 
 
Law and lawyering call for both adjudicatory and proactive lawyering, as exhibited by 
the previous section. Yet, these opposite modes of thought, interaction, and experience 
sometimes operate at cross-purposes, and even contradict each other. These opposing mindsets 
 
82 See Cohen, supra note XX; Heineman, Lee, and Wilkins, supra note, at 15 (“We need lawyers who are not just 
strong individual contributors but who have the ability to work cooperatively and constructively in groups or on 
teams that are increasingly diverse and multidisciplinary—and who can lead these teams effectively.”) 
83 Amy Cohen’s description of juvenile and family courts identifies informality, conciliation, and anti-adversarialism 
as characteristics enabling these courts to provide “social justice” in contrast to “legal justice.”  provides an example 
of the contrast between legality and proactive law and lawyering. Amy J. Cohen, Family, the Market, and ADR, 
2011 J. DISP. RESOL 91, 100-101 (2011). 
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and practices are nonetheless interdependent and mutually constitutive. In short, they are 
paradoxical. 
Although students and scholars alike have observed the tensions built into lawyering,84 
the significance of their paradoxical nature has been largely overlooked. A burgeoning literature 
demonstrates that paradoxes operate as a particular form of duality that affect how those tensions 
are experienced and whether they will undermine or facilitate the pursuit of both sides of the 
duality.85 The paradox lens thus offers a conceptual tool for engaging productively with the 
tensions between legality and proactive lawyering, paving the way for the practical strategies set 
out in Parts III and IV.  
Before exploring the five lawyering paradoxes built into lawyering, we need greater 
clarity about paradox’s meaning.86 In the legal and scholarly literature about lawyering, the term 
“paradox” is often used interchangeably with other terms conveying the idea of tensions and 
oppositions.87 I am calling attention, however, to the importance of differentiating paradoxes 
from dilemmas.88 A dilemma is a necessary choice between mutually exclusive alternatives, each 
with advantages and disadvantages.89 Bernard Williams uses the example of a person who is 
both lazy and thirsty, who is seated comfortably and the drinks are elsewhere.90 Unlike a 
dilemma, a paradox involves choices that are contradictory but interdependent rather than 
mutually exclusive. Paradoxes cannot be resolved; the contradictory elements are built into the 
situation. This self-referential and cycling quality is what constitutes a paradox.  
Peter Elbow, a scholar of teaching and learning, an example illustrating the concept of 
paradox in the context of teaching and learning: “students seldom learn well unless they give in 
 
84 See, e.g., CULLEN, supra, PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS (2003) (describing paradoxes in 
legal education, identifying practices at cross-purposes, and holding out little hope for significant change); 
DEBORAH RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 5 (2013); Larry Richard, Leadership Competencies in Law, in LAW AND 
LEADERSHIP (2013). 
85 See ELBOW, supra note ; Moshe Farjoun, Beyond Dualism: Stability and Change as a Duality. 35 Acad. Mgt. 
Rev. (AMR) 202-225. (2010); LINDA HILL, COLLECTIVE GENIUS: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF LEADING INNOVATION 
(2014); BARRY JOHNSON, POLARITY MANAGEMENT: IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS viii 
(2014); Charles A. O’Reilly and  Michael L. Tushman, Ambidexterity as a Dynamic Capability: Resolving The 
Innovator’s Dilemma, 28 ORG. BEHAV. 185 (2008): SMITH AND BERG, supra note XX;  Wendy K. Smith and 
Marianne W. Lewis, Toward a Theory of Paradox: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Organizing, 36 ACAD. OF 
MGMT. REV. 381 (2011).  
86 Scholars and commentators have sometimes used other language to described a similar phenomenon, including 
“polarities”, JOHNSON, supra note , at viii; “dualities,” Farjoun, supra note , at 205; contraries, ELBOW, supra note 
XX, at 3; and dialectics. Id. at 240.  
87 See, e.g., RHODE, supra, note XX; MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW (1993); CUMMINGS, supra note XX.  
88 Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paradox (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).  
89 Caroline Christof, The Possibility of Moral Paradox, 2 Polymath 40 (2012) (“[I]n a moral dilemma, a person is 
forced to choose one obligation over another and to elect the best course of action.”).  
90 Bernard A. Williams and W.F. Atkinson, Ethical Consistency, 39 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 103, 104 (1965).  
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or submit to teachers. Yet, they seldom learn well unless they resist or even reject their 
teachers.”91  
How people think about paradoxes actually affects how they experience them. Paradox 
scholars have explored the dynamics of paradoxes as well as the behaviors that determine 
whether paradox produces cycling back and forth between opposing alternatives—that is, 
“stuckness” or constructive struggle.92 One of the most influential sources on the meaning and 
operation of paradoxes, written by Kenwyn Smith and David Berg, focuses on the paradoxes of 
group life.93 Smith and Berg observe that groups become strong and resourceful only if the 
individuality of their members is expressed.94 Individual expression, however, sparks group 
conflict—that is, conflict capable of fostering novel understandings and disrupting group 
decision-making and performance.95 Each method of disposing of the conflict gives rise to a new 
set of tensions; the attempt to unravel these contradictory forces creates a circular process that is 
paralyzing to groups.96 
The first step in putting the paradox concept to work is to name the recurring paradoxes 
facing lawyers, and what makes them both conflicting and interdependent--that is, paradoxical. 
Drawing on the scholarly literature, teaching experience, and field research, I have identified five 
lawyering paradoxes that stem from the opposing yet interdependent features of legalistic and 
proactive lawyering: paradoxes of thought and discourse; relationship; motivation, mindset, and 
justice.  
A. Thought and Discourse Paradoxes: Methodological Skepticism v. Methodological 
Possibility 
The modes of thought characterizing legality as compared to proactive lawyering could 
be thought of as two competing methodologies.97 Legality (or adjudicatory lawyering) employs a 
methodology of skepticism, emphasizing critical thinking, logic, categorization, argumentation, 
vigilance, detachment, evaluation, and judgment.98 Proactive lawyering employs a methodology 
 
91 ELBOW, supra note , at 65. This “authority paradox” has particular salience to lawyering, and is explored more 
fully in Section, infra. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 See Charles Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy." 46 HUMAN 
RELATIONS 1133 (1993). 
96 Id. at 14.  
97 This discussion of competing methodologies is inspired by Elbow’s articulation of competing methodologies he 
detected in the context of teaching and learning. He defines “methodological doubt as “the systematic, disciplined, 
and conscious attempt to criticize everything no matter how compelling it might seem–to find flaws or 
contradictions we might miss” and methodological belief as “the equally systematic, disciplined and conscious 
attempt to believe everything no matter how unlikely or repellent it might seem—to find virtues and strengths we 
might otherwise miss. Both derive their power from the very fact that they are methodological.” ELBOW, supra note 
XX, at 257. 
98 A methodology of skepticism thus prioritizes what Kahneman calls System 2 thinking: effort, sustained attention, 
reasoning, and slow thinking required to “construct thought in an orderly series of steps” through criticism, caution, 
making comparisons, planning, exercising choice and “checking the validity of a complex logical argument.” 
KAHNEMAN, supra note , at  21, 22. 
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of possibility, emphasizing creativity, intuition, seeing patterns, learning from difference, 
innovation, empathy, experimentation, openness, and synthesis. 99  The methodologies of 
skepticism and possibility thus pull in different directions in their thought processes, aims, 
emotional valence, and role expectations.100  
The forms of reasoning that are particularly concentrated in legality’s mode of argument 
and decision making are logical, analytical, categorical, and backward looking.101 Legality 
adopts a critical and skeptical stance in thought, discourse, and decision-making. As a popular 
text on legal reasoning and writing observes:  
Your documents will be read by judges and supervising lawyers who must make decisions 
based on what you have written. They don’t read out of general curiosity. They are decisional 
readers and need you to be a decisional writer . . . Your readers are skeptical by nature and 
for good reason. Skepticism helps them make better decisions. Their job is to look for 
weaknesses in your analysis. If they find any, your writing is not helpful to them, and they 
will react negatively to it. But if your readers can’t find any weaknesses, they will rely on 
you, respect you as a professional, and be grateful for your guidance.102  
Legality requires careful thinkers who are “alert, intellectually active, less willing to be satisfied 
with superficially attractive answers, and more skeptical about their intuitions”.103 The discipline 
of analysis and interpretation holds legal thinkers to institutionally authorized forms of reasoning 
that respects institutional roles and rules.104  
Legality also explicitly invites—indeed, requires—judgment and evaluation. 
Adjudicatory lawyering harnesses ceremonial contest—using dialogue to get ideas or 
propositions to wrestle with one another so as to expose contradictions in what had been 
assumed.105 It proceeds by placing conduct and people into categories and attaching judgment to 
those categories. Legal inquiry determines fault. Decision-making involves isolating cause and 
allocating responsibility to one side as opposed to another. It casts parties as opposing and invites 
 
99 A methodology of possibility draws on what Kahneman calls System 1 thinking. Those characteristics include 
generating impressions, feelings, and inclinations, suppresses doubt, cognitive ease, and associative thinking. Id. at  
51-52.” 
100 Duncan Kennedy’s pathbreaking work also informs this typology. Kennedy juxtaposes the hermeneutic of 
suspicion vs. hermeneutic of restoration. Duncan Kennedy, A Social Psychological Interpretation of the 
Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary Legal Thought 19; Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 25 L. AND CRITIQUE 91 (2014). For a discussion of the mechanisms that account for 
the oppositional character of these modes of thought, see Kahneman, supra, BARBARA L. FREDRICKSON, POSITIVITY 
(2009); TERESA AMABILE AND STEVEN KRAMER, THE PROGRESS PRINCIPLE: USING SMALL WINS TO IGNITE JOY, 
ENGAGEMENT, AND CREATIVITY AT WORK 31 (2011). 
101 See Section IA, supra.  
102 RICHARD K. NEUMANN, ELLIE MARGOLIS, AND KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 
(8th ed. 2017).  
103  This mode of thinking corresponds to what Daniel Kahneman calls System 2 thinking. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING FAST AND SLOW 46 (2011).  
104 Michele DeStefano & Guenther Dobrauz, New Suits Appetite for Disruption in the Legal World (2019) available 
at file:///Users/susansturm/Downloads/SSRN-id3411020.pdf. 
105 This aspect of methodological skepticism is not unique to legal analysis, see ELBOW, supra note , at 262, but 
conventional legal analysis privileges this mode of thought.  
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each party to focus on the weaknesses of the other side’s position. It proceeds by narrowing the 
areas of dispute and reaching a clear, singular, and unequivocal outcome. This mode of thought 
undergirds legality’s relationship to rule-of-law values. It disciplines the exercise of power, 
cabins discretion, and clothes legal decision-making with the imprimatur of principles over 
personal biases.106 
Rules, precedent, and authority serve to justify the use of force to back up legal 
decisions.107 Robert Cover’s path-breaking work illuminated this relationship between violence 
and law’s legitimation: “Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as ‘blame’ or 
‘punishment,’ meaning is created for the event which justifies the judge to herself and to others 
with respect to her role in the acts of violence.”108 Legality thus allows decision makers to justify 
imposing decisions with serious consequences, including violence.109   
Proactive lawyering depends, in contrast, on contextual, forward looking and creative 
thinking.110  This mode of thought is sometimes called lateral thinking; “moving beyond purely 
linear, analytical thought; and shifting mental paradigms.”111 Proactive lawyering prizes 
innovation, unlike legality, which privileges authority over efficacy.112  
Legality’s skepticism cuts against the more imaginative and improvisational form of 
thinking integral to problem solving, brainstorming, and design thinking:  
Though lawyers tend to make a sport out of shooting down ideas as quickly and 
thoroughly as possible—whether it’s because ‘they’ve been tried before,’ an instinct says 
that ‘it won’t work’, or otherwise. But the designer’s mindset pushes us to explore and 
test ambitious ideas before trashing them . . . . We’ve been trained as lawyers to poke 
holes and give critiques, but often that stops us from creating new things or supporting 
others who are doing so.”113 
Many of the texts used to develop proactive lawyering capacities discourage comparing, 
categorizing, and assigning responsibility, all of which are integral to formal, authority-based 
thinking.114 Design thinking, problem solving, and facilitating difficult conversations explicitly 
 
106 See Section XX, supra. 
107 See Section , supra. 
108 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. (1986). Available at: 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol95/iss8/7 
109 “Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as “blame” or “punishment,” meaning is created for the event 
which justifies the judge to herself and to others with respect to her role in the acts of violence.” Cover, supra note 
XX, at 7. 
110 See Section IB, supra. Metaphor and narrative featuring prominently in the methodology of possibility. See  
ELBOW, supra note XX; Menkel-Meadow, supra note XX. 
111 Blasi, supra note XX, at . 
112 Id.  
113 Hagen, supra note , at http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/design-mindsets/.  
114 This pattern surfaces in the literature on design thinking, see, e.g., MICHELE DESTEFANO, LEGAL UPHEAVAL 
(2018); Margaret Hagen, Law By Design, available at http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/home/;  Amanda Perry-
Kessaris, Legal Design for Practice, Activism, Policy and Research, forthcoming J. L. & SOC’Y (Summer 2019), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295671, empathetic listning, see, e.g., ; MARSHALL ROSENBERG, 
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discourage the critical and backward-looking mode of thought that is the hallmark of legality. 
Rather than assigning fault or responsibility, the modes of thought associated with proactive 
lawyering promote mapping joint contributions,115 understanding root causes, and generating 
multiple and even conflicting approaches to a problem. The goal of proactive lawyering goal is 
to understand what actually happened so we can improve how we work together in the future.”116  
Predictability is not possible or even desired.117  
Innovation has been identified as a crucial competency and practices by design thinkers, 
experimentalists, and transactional lawyers. Proactive lawyering calls for expanding options, 
understanding connections, intuition, and legal imagination, a form of thinking that enables its 
practitioners to produce a more robust definition of the problem at hand, and a more plural 
version of possible solutions. Legal imagination involves “the ability to generate the multiple 
characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways, multiple solutions” to which students 
then apply “very well honed analytic skills.”118  
This mode of thought contrasts with the requirements of legality. The literature explicitly 
counsels the opposite approach of not judging, not blaming, not comparing or categorizing, and 
not assigning responsibility. In Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most, a 
book widely used in negotiations classes and in training lawyers, the authors designate the 
“blame frame” as an error that will get in the way of handling a difficult conversation. Proving 
we are right gets in the way of “understanding the perceptions, interpretations, and values of both 
sides.”119  The goal is to move away from judging the truth of each party’s position, establishing 
who is right and who is wrong, or allocating blame. Talking about fault “produces disagreement, 
denial, and little learning. It evokes fears of punishment and insists on an either/or answer,” (the 
essence of adversarial process). Blame and responsibility “distract us from exploring why things 
went wrong and how we might correct them going forward.” Instead, the methodology of 
possibility calls for systematic effort to see and experience the ideas of others as the speaker 
does, to listen with appreciation. This mode of inquiry “forces us to enter into unfamiliar or 
threatening ideas instead of just arguing against them without experiencing them or feeling their 
force.”120  
These differing modes of thought deploy different default modes of communication. 
Legality proceeds through argumentation and advocacy. The form of communication also 
 
NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION (2015); interacting across difference, see e.g., CAROLYN GROSE AND MARGARET 
JOHNSON, LAWYERS’ CLIENTS & NARRATIVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 56-62; and 
having difficult conversations, see, e.g, DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON, AND SHEILA HEEN , DIFFICULT 
CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (2010). 
115 STONE, PATTON, AND HEEN, supra note , at 78-79. 
116 Id. at 60. 
117 TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN 17 (2009). 
118.Rakoff & Minow, supra note 1, at x. 
119 Id. at 10.  
120 ELBOW, supra note , at 263. This mode of thought asks, “not what are your arguments in support of a [silly] 
belief,” but instead “Give me the vision in your head. You are having an experience I don’t have. Help me to have 
it.” The emphasis is not on trying to construct or defend an argument but rather to transmit an experience, or enlarge 
a vision. This mode of thought asks, “not what are your arguments in support of a [silly] belief,” but instead “Give 
me the vision in your head. You are having an experience I don’t have. Help me to have it.” Id. at 261.  
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reflects law’s formality. Dialogue within legal interactions has an instrumental purpose. It 
produces the facts and law needed to advocate, persuade, and decide. Clients and witnesses—
those who directly experience the interactions giving rise to the facts—supply that information to 
the formal actors who turn those experiences into facts that become the focus of analysis. The 
focus of attention is on questions such as: What rule or principle applies to this situation? What 
category does this situation fit into? How does this situation or actor compare to other situations 
that have previously been decided? What are the problems with this argument? What have other 
courts or authoritative sources previously decided and with what reasoning?  
This mode of communication invites a specific kind of internal listening (referred to by 
one prominent leadership reference as “level 1 listening”): “The spotlight is on the lawyer’s 
thoughts and judgments, and conclusions. Listening serves to get the information needed to 
decide how to use or act on what you learn.”121 The focus of awareness is on the relationship of 
the facts to relevant legal categories. The thought process proceeds by comparing the situation at 
hand to other situations to determine their legal significance. The purpose of this analysis is 
evaluation and judgment. The structure, timing, and purpose of interactions flow from the aim of 
evaluating and judging for the purposes of producing a decision. The personal stories underlying 
the facts presented in legal decisions matter only in so far as they relate to the relevant legal 
categories.122 
For interactions aimed at having building a relationship, difficult conversations, 
designing innovative solutions, or solving problems, however, “arguing may seem natural, even 
reasonable. But it is not helpful. . . [It] “interferes with the ability to learn how the other person 
sees the world.”123 In contrast, the practices of proactive lawyering invite “a move from certainty 
to curiosity, from debate to exploration, from simplicity to complexity.”124 This stance of 
curiosity is embraced in design thinking, conflict resolution, coaching, systems thinking, and 
problem solving. The purpose of inquiry is understanding, integrating, and making sense of 
differing perspectives. The focus is on understanding. Communication adopts a both/and, rather 
than a yes/but stance. Even if you are convinced you are right, the conversation is not about 
establishing who’s right. The focus is on working out a way to connect that will enable you to 
move forward.  
The methodology of possibility thus calls for a different kind of listening and inquiry. 
The idea is not to categorize but instead to understand, learn, and see the possibility for two 
stories that conflict and still coexist. Kinsey-House refers to this as level 2 (dialogue) and level 3 
(global listening).125 Design thinking shares this focus on communicating to learn about and 
engage intended beneficiaries: “to deliver to them something that will be useful and usable to 
them, first you need to understand them. This means caring deeply about their needs, their values 
 
121 KIMSEY-HOUSE et al, supra note, at 33. 
122 MERTZ, supra, note, at 9 (“When handed a case to read, you now automatically check to see what the court did in 
reaching its decision. Poignant, glaring, pitiful stories of human drama and misery begin to sail easily past you, as 
you take them expertly in hand and dissect them for the “relevant” facts.”) 
123 STONE, PATTON, AND HEEN, supra note, at 26, 29. 
124 Id. at 37. 
125 See KINSEY-HOUSE, supra note XX. 
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and their behavior.”126 Rather than engaging in arguments and counter arguments, this approach 
invites questions such as: “what’s interesting or helpful about the view? What are some of the 
intriguing features that others might not have noticed? What would you notice if you believed 
this view? If it were true? In what senses or under what conditions might this idea be true?127  
The aims of adjudicatory as compared to proactive modes of thought pull in different 
directions. Legality aims to produce a single, certain right answer, a singularity of meaning that 
will decide a particular conflict. Its aim is to narrow the scope of dispute, and settle on a single 
answer that disposes of the conflict. Proactive lawyering, at least at some stage of the process, 
generates multiple possibilities.128  
The emotional valence associated with the methodology of skepticism (critique and 
analysis) also conflicts with the emotions associated with methodology of possibility (creativity 
and imagination). There is growing evidence that:   
Good mood, intuition, creativity, gullibility, and increased reliance on System 1 form a 
cluster. At the other pole, sadness, vigilance, suspicion, an analytic approach, and 
increased effort also go together. A happy mood loosens the control of System 2 over 
performance: when in a good mood, people become more intuitive and more creative but 
also less vigilant and more prone to logical errors. Cognitive ease is both a cause and a 
consequence of a pleasant feeling. 129  
Recent research has revealed that emotions can have both positive and negative effects on a 
range of work behaviors, including creativity, decision making, and negotiations.130  For 
example, positive feelings can lead to greater flexibility in problem solving and negotiations.131 
By contrast, negative emotions narrow and restrict the social and cognitive environment; at the 
same time, they facilitate careful and unbiased judgment.132 
Notwithstanding their tensions, these two modes of thought depend upon each other for 
their successful realization, and even give rise to their opposite twin even as they resist that call. 
Judgment and evaluation require the input of accurate and reliable information that can only be 
obtained through forms of inquiry that do not prejudge or evaluate, and that employ empathy, 
appreciate listening, and learning.133 Clear rules and boundaries can, under certain conditions, 
actually enable creativity. Linear and logical analysis alone cannot reach a resolution in 
situations of ambiguity and competing values, at least if it is to proceed with integrity and 
 
126 BROWN, supra note.  
127 ELBOW, supra at 275. 
128 Both use analogy, but for different and, in some respects, conflicting purposes.  
129 ELBOW, supra note XX, at 69. 
130 AMABILE KRAMER, supra note XX, at  31. 
131 Barbara Fredrickson provides research associating positive emotions—such as joy, amusement and interest—
with broadening perspectives; they build social and intellectual resources. FREDRICKSON, supra note XX. 
132 KAHNEMAN, supra note XX, at 69. 
133 BINDER, BERGMAN, TREMBLAY, AND WEINSTEIN, supra note , at 1-4; MacCrate Report at 151-152. 
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legitimacy. Critical legal theorists are joined by legal process adherents in noting the 
interdependence of legality and purpose:  
The demands of inner morality of the law are affirmative in nature: make the law known, 
make it coherent and clear, see that your decisions as an official are guided by it etc. To 
meet these demands human energy must be directed toward specific kinds of 
achievement, and not merely warned away from harmful acts.”134  
Critical legal scholars, legal process scholars, and pragmatic lawyers alike have recognized the 
necessity of generating (and then choosing between) multiple plausible ways of proceeding or 
prioritizing of values, which in turn calls for the methodology of possibility, even as part of 
adjudicatory decision making. Roberto Unger also shows how conventional legal analysis leads 
to discovering the limits of that legal analysis and the dependence on more proactive and 
imaginative modes of thought: 
When we begin to explore ways of ensuring the practical conditions for the effective 
enjoyment of rights, we discover at every turn that there are alternative plausible ways of 
defining these conditions, and then of satisfying them once they have been defined. For 
every such conception, there are different plausible strategies to fulfill the specified 
conditions . . . . Thus, a method designed to vindicate conceptual unity and institutional 
necessity revealed unimagined diversity and opportunity in established law.135 
The multiplicity of possibilities generates a need for resolution, either to enable progress toward 
a goal or to resolve conflicts.  
The paradoxical relationship also cuts in the opposite direction: the methodology of 
possibility requires engagement with the methodology of skepticism to succeed. Negative 
feedback and critique are crucial to learning and improvement, even as it discourages the 
disclosures necessary to enable that critique to happen. Intuition and creativity are susceptible to 
bias, which requires methodology of skepticism as a form of accountability.136 Design thinking, 
innovation, and problem solving require boundaries to enable creativity, as well as ways to deal 
with conflict that cannot be resolved through dialogue. Researchers have documented the critical 
role of boundaries, limits, and rules in setting the conditions that enable creativity.137 Indeed, 
design thinking makes explicit the need for both types of thinking by calling first for flaring–the 
generation of ideas without critique and then for funneling–critical analysis of those ideas (even 
as it generally fails to address the tensions between them).138 
Thought and discourse paradoxes are built into law at the level of the meaning, structure 
and operation of law. Law operates through the simultaneous operation of practices and precepts 
that create the possibility for creative and cooperative action, while also affording the vehicle for 
 
134 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (1964). 
135 UNGER, supra note, at 28-29, 42. 
136 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 2007-2008, 
137 See O’Reilly and Tushman, supra  note , at ; ELBOW, supra note XX; KAHNEMAN, supra note XX.  
138 Hagen, supra note XX; Perry-Kessaris, supra note XX. 
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preventing destructive conflict by imposing general norms backed by the force of the state. This 
role contradiction has been identified both by jurists committed to legal decision making as the 
basis for law’s legitimacy and by critical legal theorists who have located this contradiction in 
legal rationality’s failure to acknowledge the ideological and institutional commitments 
underlying conventional legal decision making.139 
Lawyers operating within conventional legal thought are called upon both to accept the 
constraints of conventional legal analysis even when those constraints operate against problem 
solving, while they are also called upon to find ways to solve the problems that bring clients to 
them. As problems increase in complexity and the limits of rule-based solutions become more 
evident, lawyers operating in both the public and private sectors occupy positions that call for 
creativity alongside critique.140  
Thus, although conventional 1L curriculum and jurisprudence equate “thinking like a 
lawyer” with the thought processes of legality, lawyering actually involves a broader and 
sometimes conflicting array of thought processes that depend upon each other for their effective 
operation.141 
 
B. Relationship Paradoxes: Strategic vs. Trust-based  
Legality and proactive lawyering promote different and sometimes conflicting practices 
and assumptions related to building and conducting relationships. Within the framework of 
legality, as rehearsed in the conventional law school classroom and the formal legal system, 
formal roles define the contours and purpose of relationships. Students are invited to step into the 
shoes of various legal personae, and the relationships they develop both in the class and with the 
roles they play reflect the characters and settings defined by the “distinctively legal drama.”142 
Relationships are instrumental, defined by formal roles and legal interests. Selves are conceived 
and relevant characteristics defined by their relationship to the legal problem. Elizabeth Mertz 
documents this pattern of identity formation in the first year classroom:  
 
As people in the cases become parties (i.e. strategic actors on either side of the legal 
argument), they are stripped of social position and specific context, located in geography 
of legal discourse and authority. Their gender, race, class, occupational, and other 
identities become secondary to their ability to argue that they have met various aspects of 
legal texts. These contextual factors do sometimes become salient to the discussions, but 
only as ammunition in just this way.143 
 
139 See Kennedy, supra note XX; UNGER, supra note XX. 
140 Raymond H Brescia, Creative Lawyering for Social Change, 35 Georgia State U.L. Rev. 529 (2019).  
141 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal 
Education? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 103 (2001) (“The creative legal problem solver, then, must learn to 
navigate within the seas of optimistic creativity, the swells of dynamic interaction with others (client and other 
counsel and parties) and the oceans of realistic legal possibility.”) 
142 MERTZ, supra note , at 97. 
143 Id. at 131. 
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Classroom discourse “models a split between the selves with which [they] approach problems: 
there is the personal opinion, which [they] hold in abeyance and over which they exercise 
control, and there is the professional response, which is “agnostic” and whose primary goal is 
honing the students’ discursive power.”144 Students are encouraged “to adopt a new, more 
distanced attitude toward morality and emotion.” Their effectiveness turns on their ability to 
strategize and make arguments, and to channel discomfort or emotion into “arguments”.145 
Relationships also have an instrumental character to them, defined by the purpose of the 
interaction. Dialogue is both central and scripted, with the lawyer and the judge setting the terms, 
flow, and areas of inquiry. Lawyer/client relationships (and currency of time for measuring 
value) set clear boundaries on the form, purpose, and scope of interactions, both between the 
lawyer and the client and among adversaries. Students learn to see and be able to argue both 
sides of an argument, and to see the strengths and weaknesses of their own argument from the 
perspective of the other side.  
 
Legality’s ideal is “blind justice”—dispassionate application of rules to objectively 
determined facts, with decisions governed by reason rather than politics or emotion. Legality 
operates to maintain distance and minimize vulnerability and expression of emotion.146 
Emotional distancing enables lawyers and judges to exercise their roles requiring them to witness 
and even cause human pain, and thus both cope and escape responsibility:  
 
The judicial conscience is an artful dodger and rightfully so. Before it will concede that a 
case is one that presents a moral dilemma, it will hide in the nooks and crannies of the 
professional ethics, run to the cave of role limits, seek the shelter of separation of 
powers.147  
Conflict is managed indirectly by intermediaries, with the emphasis on producing a result that is 
favorable to the client or that warrants respect and adherence, rather than achieving 
understanding or reshaping the nature of the relationship among the parties. Those with the direct 
stake in the outcome of the legal context rely on representatives to speak on their behalf. Trust 
and legitimacy come from fulfillment of role expectations, the ability to rely on the predictability 
and accountability built into the formal relationship and transparency of the legal process. Within 
the legal process, groups who lack power and access outside of the legal system have a formal 
opportunity to interact and be heard.148 Conflict is managed through ritualized processes and 
representation, rather than by direct engagement of the stakeholders. Emotions are to be 
managed rather than worked through.149  
 
 
144 Id. at 122.  
145 Id. at 101.  
146 Oliver Goodenough, Institutions, Emotions and Law: A Goldilocks Problem for Mechanism Design, 33 
VERMONT L.R. 395 (2009). 
147 ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 201 (1975). 
148 Minow, supra note , at 1912.  
149 See Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between 
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509 (1994). 
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Proactive lawyering, in contrast, prioritizes building relationships of trust that enable 
people to work together, disclose sensitive information, share perspectives, and have difficult 
conversations. The development of mutual trust is key to lawyers’ counseling and advising roles, 
as well as to structuring productive interactions that can achieve mutual aims. 150 Mobilizing 
people to achieve a common goal requires cultivating informal relationships in which people 
seek to connect, engage openly with emotions and needs, develop empathy, and build trust. New 
governance and negotiation “share methodological and normative commitments to purposive 
human development, to an expansive imagination of human possibilities, to the idea that these 
possibilities are expansive because human desires are dynamic and produced through social 
interaction.151 Design thinking asks lawyers to develop mutual relationships where stakeholders 
speak in the first person and share their interests and needs: 
 
Being user-centered means Being Participatory, looping in stakeholders into your 
process. You can have the people you’re working with join you in trying to create new 
solutions. Rather than you playing the all-powerful expert who will solve their problems 
for them, the participatory approach means deferring to your users and other experts at 
key moments. The users’ voices should drive your work.152 
Effective collaboration calls for authenticity, connection, credibility, and empathy.153 
Proactive lawyering treats emotion as a driver of self-awareness, creativity, inspiration, and 
understanding. It calls for the willingness to take risks, which in turn both requires and builds 
relational trust. This calls for engaging with your own emotions and those of others, 
understanding your own and others needs, seeing how aspects of experience beyond reason and 
rationality affect the way we think and act, and learning how to “have your feelings or they will 
have you.”154  
In contrast with legality’s de-emphasis on identity, client-centered lawyering encourages 
embracing cultural differences rather than fearing for their impact.155 Proactive lawyering 
generally highlights the role of developing empathy, which is a different kind of perspective 
taking than seeing both sides of an argument. Empathy involves “shifting from how you seem on 
the inside to my imagining of what it feels like to be you on the inside, wrapped in your skin, 
with your set of experiences and background, and looking out from the world from your eyes.”156 
Empathy operates alongside reflective practice as a crucial mode of inquiry and understanding 
for proactive lawyers.157 Both enable lawyers to uncover ways in which their own views and 
 
150 Charles Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy. 46 HUMAN 
RELATIONS, 1133 (1992) (defining trust as “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit the 
other’s vulnerability”); Claire Hill and Erin O’Hara O’Connoll, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1717 (2006).  
151 Cohen, supra, note , at 517.  
152 Hagen, supra note , at http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/design-mindsets/#criticism.  
153 BILL GEORGE, PETER SIMS, ANDREW N. MCLEAN, AND DIANA MAYER, AUTHENTIC LEADERSHIP 4 (2018).  
154 STONE, PATTON, AND HEEN, supra, at; ROSENBERG, ANDERSON AND ADAMS, supra; DEBORAH L. RHODE AND 
AMANDA K. PACKEL, LEADERSHIP FOR LAWYERS 30 (2018); MNOOKIN, PEPPET, AND TULUMELLO, supra. 
155 BINDER et al, supra note , at 6; GROSE AND JOHNSON, supra note XX, at 37-43 (2017). 
156 STONE, PATTON, & HEEN, supra note, at 184. 
157 GROSE AND JOHNSON, supra note , at ; MacCrate Report, supra note , at 66. 
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assumptions color the kind of advice they offer, assess facts, and prioritize values.158 “Emotion, a 
potential barrier to problem solving, when carefully understood and revealed is vulnerable to a 
set of strategies designed to enhance productive self-expression.”159 Value differences are 
engaged directly and become the focus of negotiation and problem solving.160 
 
Collaboration and team building also call upon lawyers to building informal relationships 
that enable trust building:161 
Even in highly stressful situations such as litigation, [lawyers] develop a working 
relationship whenever possible, including with their clients and even with opposing 
counsel and parties. They take a collaborative, noncompetitive approach to many 
situations, are good at listening and are open to new ideas. [They] gather vital 
information through conversation, dialogue, questions, and interaction. They thoroughly 
vet their ideas with their colleagues, learn from their adversaries, and collaborate 
whenever possible. Through inquiry and collaboration, they develop their own emotional 
insights and inspire the same awareness and capacities in their team members.162  
Proactive lawyering aims to build the capacity of stakeholders, parties, communities, and 
organizations to organize, deliberate, work together, solve problems, and pursue common 
goals.163 Collaboration and relationship building are also important to learning, staying engaged, 
being able to work effectively in groups, and fulfilling group related functions successfully, 
including those related to legality.164 Technology, globalization, complexity, and market forces 
are forcing private practitioners and public interest lawyers toward collaboration. 165 
Adam Kahane, a prominent conflict resolution documents the conventional understanding of 
collaboration to push adversarialism and conflict into the shadows, and to proceed as if “we can 
problem-solve our way into the future.” He shows the paradoxical relationship between conflict 
and collaboration—the risk of unconstrained engaging. “Conventional collaboration focuses on 
engaging, and that does not make room for asserting, so it becomes ossified and brittle; it settles 
 
158 GROSE AND JOHNSON, supra note , at 54-55 (discussing the importance of cross-cultural communication in 
lawyering).  
159 Cohen, supra note , at 525.  
160 See, e.g., Michael Dort, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 NYU L. Rev. 875, 975 (2003)(practical 
deliberation. . . can work around value differences, and in the long run, even change them.”). 
161 Heidi Gardner, Effective Teamwork and Collaboration, in MANAGING TALENT FOR SUCCESS: TALENT 
DEVELOPMENT IN LAW FIRMS: 145–159 (R. Normand-Hochman ed., 2013); Liebman et cl, supra note, at  
162 ROBERT CULLEN, supra, note, at 11. 
163 See, e.g. Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models For Social Justice Lawyering, Charles Sabel, Beyond 
Principal-Agent Governance: Experimentalist Organizations, Learning, and Accountability, quoted in Cohen, supra 
note , at 528 (innovations “such as benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, continuous monitoring, error detection 
and root cause analysis” make it possible to devolve decision making control to “civil society actors” in ways that 
promote “social learning about the effective pursuit of the broad imprecise goals”). 
164 DWECK, supra, Sturm and Guinier, supra, Edmunson, supra.  
165 Gardner, supra note XX. 
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into a stupor and gets stuck . . . If we embrace harmonious engagement and reject discordant 
asserting, we will end up suffocating the social system we are working with.”166 
Legality and proactive lawyering thus promote opposite and, in some respects, 
conflicting approaches to relationships. Elizabeth Mertz summarizes the double edge character of 
this legal mediation of relationships: 
 
On one hand, the approach to legal reading found in law school classrooms offers 
students a potentially liberating opportunity to step into an impersonal, abstract, and 
objective approach to human conflict. On the other hand, erasing (or marginalizing) many 
of the concrete social and contextual features of these conflicts can direct attention away 
from grounded moral understandings, which some critics believe are crucial to achieving 
justice.  
 
The tensions also work in the other direction. The distancing and detachment required by 
formality and adversarialism undercuts the trust building and interpersonal responsibility that is 
necessary to effective implementation of norms.167 William Simon illustrates this dynamic in his 
article on the impact of legalization on the welfare system: 
While the formalization of AFDC rules and procedures “seem[s] to have reduced the 
claimant’s experience of oppressive and punitive moralism, of invasion of privacy, and of 
dependence on idiosyncratic personal favor …[it] also [has] reduced their experience of 
trust and personal care and [has] increased their experience of bewilderment and 
opacity.”168 
Formality also hides from view “the contextual and human factors that influence how people 
observe and interpret facts.”169   
Robert Cover conveys the irresolvable tension between proactive lawyering’s organic norm 
communities and the relationship underlying legality. Legality’s relationship to state power and 
violence destroys the normative ties between judge and those before the court, as well as those 
attached to the court’s power:170  
As long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long 
as people are committed to using or resisting the social organization of violence in making 
 
166 ADAM KAHANE, COLLABORATING WITH THE ENEMY: HOW TO WORK WITH PEOPLE YOU DON’T AGREE WITH OR 
LIKE OR TRUST 55, 65 (2017). 
167 Massaro, supra note ; Charles Sabel, Studied Trust, Tyler and Bies, Macaulay (1963), Scott, Sabel. Sim B. Sitkin 
and Robert J. Bies, The Legalistic Organization: Definitions, Dimensions, and Dilemmas, 4 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 
345 (1993). 
168 Quoted in Massaro, supra note XX, at  
169 Bartholet, supra note XX, at .  
170 Cover, supra note ; Minow, supra note XX; KISSAM, supra note , at 96.  
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their interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that can 
be achieved.171  
Yet, both types of relationships are necessary for effective lawyering; law students and 
lawyers must learn to navigate this tension between relationships premised on strategic 
interaction and relationships oriented around building trust. Adversaries who cannot cooperate 
are less effective in making deals and settling cases.172 Effective learning in law school depends 
upon being able both to operate in formal public settings and to build authentic relationships, 
take the risk of being wrong, and ask for help when you need it. Lawyers cannot obtain the 
information needed to build a case or design a deal without building a relationship of trust, which 
requires building empathetic relationships with clients, with whom they also have a formal and 
bounded professional relationship defined by instrumental aims. Litigation both invites mutual 
cooperation to avoid the limitations of solutions derived through adversary process and creates 
conditions that make cooperation difficult and even risky.173 Effective lawyering requires both 
relationships of trust and the capacity to detach, assert positions, and fight when necessary.174 
 
C. Motivation Paradoxes: Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation 
Legality and proactive lawyering take contrary approaches to motivating behavior. 
Within legality’s logic, the motivation for adhering to norms is basically extrinsic, in the form of 
duty, incentives, threats, and coercion.175  Legality takes a compliance orientation and ultimately 
relies on force, or the power of the state to enforce norms and motivate behavior. Legal actors 
achieve adherence through the imposition of legal requirements, the expression of legal duties to 
comply with those responsibilities, threats of negative consequences for failing to adhere, and 
when necessary, coercion.  
Proactive lawyering, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of using persuasion, 
learning, creation of shared purpose, inspiration, and participation as ways to motivate 
behavioral change. These strategies deploy intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is “doing 
work because it is interesting, enjoyable, satisfying, engaging, or personally challenging,” 176  
while extrinsic motivation is the desire for a “separable outcome,” such as a reward or avoidance 
of a penalty.177 Interpersonal commitments are characterized by reciprocal acknowledgment. 
Proactive lawyering’s broader roles call for a different relationship to values and purpose, and 
 
171 Cover, supra note (Violence and the Word), at 1629. 
172 Gilson and Mnookin, supra note . 
173 Id. at 521 (“In litigation, where even cooperative behavior occurs in the context of a competitive environment, 
the risk of misunderstanding an opponent's move is significant.”) 
174  KAHANE, supra note XX, at 31; Goldberg, supra note .  
175 Extrinsic motivation is the grasp of what needs to be done and the drive to do it in order to get something else. 
AMABILE, supra note , at 34 
176 Id at 34.  
177 Id.  
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highlights the importance of self-awareness, connecting to values, acting consistently with 
purpose, practicing one’s values and principles.178  
This tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations also plays out in the incentive 
structures shaping law students’ and lawyers’ choices. Many law students came to law school out 
of genuine and intrinsic interest in the law and a desire to advance deeply held public values and 
positive social change, but experience the pull of extrinsic motivations (grades, prestige, money) 
coming from law school and the legal profession. 179  A study of students at Yale Law School 
documents this tension between prestige and purpose that many students experience when they 
arrive at law school.180 A similar tension operates in private practice as well.181  
The tension between intrinsic and extrinsic ways of motivating behavior is well 
documented in legal, psychological, and economic literature. Scholars have shown that extrinsic 
motivation in the form of punishment, threat, carrots, and sticks, can crowd out intrinsic 
motivation, which is necessary for changes in behavior required for compliance with those 
norms.182  “If extrinsic motivators are extremely strong and salient, they can undermine intrinsic 
motivation: when this happens, creativity can suffer.”183 The reliance on extrinsic motivations 
that coerce or induce compliance through threat of sanctions can undermine the acceptance of the 
court’s legitimacy, the willingness to take risks and assume responsibility.184  
Katherine Bartlett summarized these tensions in an article analyzing the impact of law on 
norm internalization related to implicit discrimination.185 On one hand, law provokes compliance 
by “symbolizing a consensus” that may challenge people to think critically about and perhaps 
revise their thoughts. It may reinforce a self-identity consistent with complying with the law, and 
educate others on what it means to be a good person. On the other hand, coercion may provoke 
resistance when people feel a law is unfair, or when it insults their sense of identity or autonomy. 
Law may also be in a more fundamental tension with internal motivation: it may crowd out 
 
178 Lee & Wilkins, supra,  at ; MacCrate Report, supra note ; MNOOKIN, PEPPET, AND TULUMELLO, supra. 
RHODE, supra note , at .  
179 See John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired Guns? An Empirical Analysis of “Public Interest Drift in Law School; 
Mertz, supra note; Sturm and Guinier, supra Pete Davis, Our Bicentennial Crisis, available at 
http://hlrecord.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/OurBicentennialCrisis.pdf. 
180 Susan Sturm and Kinga Makovi, Full Participation in the Yale Law Journal (2015), available at:  
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/files/FullParticipationintheYaleLawJournal_otc6qdnr.pdf. See also sources cited at 
note , supra. 
181 See Scott L. Cummings, Introduction: What Good Are Lawyers?, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: 
LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 1-2 (Scott L. Cummings ed. 2011). 
182 Kristin Underhill has provided a useful analysis of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
Kristin Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to 
Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. REG. 213 (2016). 
183 AMABILE, supra note XX, at 35.  
184 The economic and psychological literature documents “how incentives may have counterintuitive and 
counterproductive effects on human behavior.” Id. See also Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note XX, at 25. 
185 Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation In Reducing Implicit 
Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009) 
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people’s sense of responsibility to do the right thing in the absence of a coercive rule backed by a 
sanction.186 
 This analysis corresponds to the literature’s approach to motivating behavior. One text 
aimed at promoting empathetic interaction puts it this way: “When we submit to doing 
something solely for the purpose of avoiding punishment, our attention is distracted from the 
value of the action itself. Instead, we are focused on the consequences of what might happen if 
we fail to take that action.”187 This leads to “diminished goodwill on the part of those who 
comply with our values out of a sense of either external or internal coercion.”188 
Robert Cover’s work places this tension between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in the 
context of a fundamental and unavoidable tension built into the meaning and structure and 
operation of law. Law works through the simultaneous operation of practices and precepts that 
create the possibility for creative and cooperative action, while also affording the vehicle for 
preventing destructive conflict by imposing general norms backed by the force of the state. This 
produces an irreconcilable tension between law’s role in fostering and promoting creative and 
organic norm communities (which generate conflict among those communities) and its role in 
using violence to enforce order-preserving norms (which undercuts those norm communities).189 
Yet, this tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is built into the educational 
enterprise (not only law school), lawyers’ roles, and the legal system. Although the prevailing 
culture in many law schools skews that tension in favor of extrinsic motivations, adult 
educational theory demonstrates the necessity of both investing in students’ growth and assessing 
their performance.190 Likewise, part of law’s value lies in its simultaneous proximity to power 
and its responsibility for enhancing value and values.  
 
D. Mindset Paradoxes: Fixed vs. Growth Mindset 
These differing constellations of thinking, communicating, and relating, combine to 
produce competing mindsets with different and in ways competing orientations to conflict, 
failure, and risk. Within the frame of legality, conflict serves to define issues that have to be 
resolved, and to juxtapose competing views of the facts and law, thus presenting a third party 
with the strongest articulation of each side. The conflict resolution process enables an impartial 
and detached third party to decide which side wins the conflict. Conflict is a contest, with a 
winner and loser. The role of the legal process is to reduce or resolve conflict. The judicial 
 
186 Id. at 1937.  
187 ROSENBERG, supra, at 188.  
188 Id. At 15-16.  
189 Cover, supra note XX, at (“The conclusion emanating from this state of affairs is simple and very disturbing: 
there is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the organization of law as 
meaning.”). 
190 See ELBOW, supra note XX, at . Bonita London, Geraldine Downey, and Shauna Mace, Psychological Theories 
of Educational Engagement: A Multi-Method Approach to Studying Individual Engagement and Institutional 
Change, 60 VAND. L. REV. 455 (2007). 
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system (or its equivalent when mimicked in other settings) is justified as operating as a theater of 
competition to displace and defuse violent conflict and increase the legitimacy of decision 
making.191 
Within the frame of proactive lawyering, conflict is a function of inevitable difference, 
and a normal part of human interaction. The orientation to conflict is to find a way to understand 
where it stems from, whether there are points of connection that would enable people to work 
together in the face of that conflict. Conflict thus invites engagement, exploration of the 
underlying source of the difference, and a way of acknowledging the feelings, needs, and 
requests of each participant in the conflict.  
Competing approaches to failure also exemplifies the tension between adjudicatory and 
proactive logic. In the context of the adversary process, mistakes and failures matter in so far as 
they cross a legal line and make that behavior susceptible to a finding of fault. Thus, fault and 
mistakes are either a basis for entitlement to relief or for exposure to judgment. Failure means 
losing. Thinking and analysis focuses on whether wrongful behavior occurred, if so whether it 
could be adjudged unlawful. Mistakes are to be minimized or avoided because they cause 
actionable harm or give rise to liabilities, or adjudged wrongful if they occur. For a law student, 
making a mistake on a cold call in class means not “getting it”.192 
In the context of proactive lawyering, failure plays a very different role. Failure operates 
as the driver of learning and growth. The important question is not whether the behavior violated 
a norm, but rather, how can the relevant participants learn and change from the failures and 
mistakes? The motto of design thinking is “fail early to succeed sooner.”193 The process of 
building effective teams and collaboration requires building conditions of psychological and 
identity safety.194 The hallmark of psychological safety is being able to make mistakes without 
fear that you will be labeled or judged as a result. The driver of improvement in new governance 
is the identification of failures at the moment they occur by those closest to the problem.195 
These different approaches to failure give rise to different orientations to risk, particularly 
under conditions of uncertainty. Legality invites treating legal risk as something to be minimized 
or avoided. It’s risky to ask questions when you don’t know the answer or to act in the face of 
legal uncertainty. Playing it safe means not taking actions that could invite litigation or 
judgment. In contrast, proactive lawyering treats risk as a necessary part of learning, growth, and 
innovation.196 
 
191 See Edelman, supra note XX, 
192 Sturm and Guinier, supra note XX.  
193 TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN: HOW DESIGN THINKING TRANSFORMS ORGANIZATIONS AND INSPIRES 
INNOVATION 4 (2009). 
194 Amy C. Edmunson, Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 350 (1999) 
Valerie Purdy-Vaughns, Claude Steele, C. M., Davies, P. G., Ditlmann, R., & Crosby, J. R. Social Identity 
Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions. 94 J. 
PERSONALITY AND SOC.PSYCH. 615 (2008). 
195 Simon, supra note XX, at 47. 
196 See DESTEFANO, supra note .  
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Legality and proactive lawyering have diametrically opposing reactions to uncertainty. 
Legality treats uncertainty as something to be reduced and managed, and its unavoidability 
produces pessimism about law’s capacity to address the issue. Proactive lawyering (such as 
experimentalism, design thinking, deal making, and negotiations) takes a contrary view:   
This incompleteness of facts, circumstances, priorities, and normative benchmarks is not 
necessarily a challenge to overcome or even a source of conceptual trouble. To the 
contrary, it provides the basis for great optimism. It is precisely because interests and 
priorities are multiple and shifting rather than fixed and known to parties in advance of 
dialogue, that there are vast opportunities for individuals to innovate, collaborate, and 
solve very hard problems.197  
Legality’s approach to failure, risk, and conflict coalesce into a mindset or orientation 
that corresponds what Carol Dweck has called a fixed mindset.198 A fixed mindset equates 
success and failure with people’s abilities, which are fixed. Success or failure defines who you 
are. Law’s focus invites a fixed mindset by putting people in categories based on their past 
behavior and assigning meaning to that person based on those categories. Failure is equated with 
being wrong (or at least being found wrong), and thus with losing. Failure is therefore something 
to be avoided.  
Individuals with a fixed mindset emphasize compliance, control, and satisfying 
expectations—all of which form an important (and desired) part of law school and legality. 
Martin Seligman has noted the zero-sum character of adversary process as a root of the mindset 
paradox: 
One of the triggers for combating demoralization involves the avoidance of zero-sum 
situations. In law, such situations seem inevitable; they lie at the heart of our adversarial 
system of justice. If we accept that the adversary model embraces important social 
values, displacing it may not be in our interest. If so, some degree of lawyer unhappiness 
may be unavoidable if we are to achieve societal goals. This raises the ironic possibility 
that lawyers can be made happier only at public expense.199  
Studies have associated law students with a pessimistic explanatory style: “a tendency to 
interpret the causes of negative events in stable, global and internal ways: “It's going to last 
forever; it's going to undermine everything; it's my own fault”. Under this definition, the 
pessimist will view bad events as unchangeable. The optimist, in contrast, sees setbacks as 
temporary.”200 
Proactive lawyering both demands and cultivates a growth mindset. Design thinking, 
experimentalism, mediation and negotiation, and problem-solving courts all emphasize the 
importance of learning and growth, the role of failure as a driver of growth and change, and the 
 
197 Cohen, supra note XX. 
198 DWECK, supra note XX, at 6. See KATHRYN M. YOUNG, HOW TO BE SORT OF HAPPY IN LAW SCHOOL 109 
(2018). 
199 Seligman, supra note XX. 
200 Rosen, supra note XX. 
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importance of creating environments and relationships that enable people to take risks, try out 
new ideas, and share what they don’t know.  
As Ben Heineman has noted, success and thriving in both law school and the legal 
profession actually requires both mindsets:  
We need lawyers who, in making recommendations or decisions, are capable of assessing 
all dimensions of risk but who are not risk-averse. Taking well-considered chances is not 
a quality of mind customarily associated with lawyers but is often vital to innovation and 
change in the public and private sectors.201  
A growth mindset also enables law students to navigate the inevitable stresses and setbacks that 
students experience while they learn to “think like a lawyer.”  
Yet, laws’ connection to judgment necessitates operating within the fixed mindset. When 
learning and growth fails to produce a resolution, law and lawyers step in to impose one, using 
processes premised on a fixed mindset. That aspect of lawyering fulfills a core function of the 
rule of law, as well as a paradoxical relationship with proactive lawyering’s call for imagination, 
creativity, and learning from failure. 
 
E. Justice Paradoxes: Formal vs. Substantive Justice 
Finally, legality and proactive lawyering deploy conflicting yet intertwined conceptions 
of justice. There are three aspects to the justice paradox, all of which connect to legality’s 
relationship to power. The first stems from legality’s reliance on the instruments of the state as 
the way to advance justice. Legality works within state-baked legal processes to advance norms. 
The legitimacy of law’s operation and lawyers’ roles derives from their operation within a 
system that disciplines the exercise of power. Formality, authority, and adversarialism occupy a 
central place in the narrative of law’s claim to justice, at least as an indispensable means of 
pursuing substantive justice.202 As Unger has described this characteristic of legality: 
A system of rules is formal insofar as it allows its . . . interpreters to justify their 
decisions by reference to the rules themselves and to the presence or absence of facts 
stated by the rules . . . Everything will depend on where one draws the line between the 
factors of decision that are intrinsic to the system, and therefore worthy of consideration, 
and those that are not.203  
Law thus operates as self-referential system. It cannot promise substantive justice “in a 
community whose members disagree with one another about what substantive justice amounts 
 
201 HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, at 15. 
202 Waldron, supra note XX, at 117. 
203 R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 204 (1976). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424 
40 LAWYERING PARADOXES 25-Oct-19 
 
Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission 
.  
 
to.” In imposing formal justice, it will necessarily collide with and destroy the norms of a 
subgroup whose values conflict with those upheld through legality. 204  
Those instruments of legality are themselves unjust in significant ways, which leads to 
the second aspect of the justice paradox. Substantive injustice is baked into the legal system 
itself. Those injustices inhere in the origins of constitution upholding slavery, the rules set up so 
that the “haves come out ahead,” and the starkly unequal access to justice pervading our legal 
system. The methodology of legality is itself not neutral. Legal realists, critical theorists, critical 
race theorists, and feminist scholars have identified this contradiction between formal justice and 
justice as lived experience in the world as it actually operates.205 
Methods shape substance also through the hidden biases they contain. The method of 
distinguishing law from considerations of policy, likewise, reinforces existing power 
structures and masks exclusions or perspectives ignored by that law . . . A strong view of 
precedent in legal method, for example, protects the status quo over the interests of those 
seeking recognition of new rights.”206  
This contradiction exemplifies “the internal instability characteristic of programmatic positions 
in contemporary law and politics: the conflict between the commitment to defining ideals and the 
acquiescence in the arrangements that frustrate the realization of those ideals or impoverish their 
meaning.”207  The challenge, then, is to figure out “how to maintain a normative commitment to 
the rule of law when we can foresee that this commitment will everywhere be betrayed by the 
actions of the very positive legal institutions charged with implementing the rule of law.208 
Although the crisis of legitimacy in the Trump era is recent, the paradox is at least as old 
as the Constitution. Robert Cover documented the tension between positive and moral justice 
faced by judges charged with enforcing the law of slavery.209 Martin Luther King powerfully 
communicated this dual character of law’s justice in the Letter from the City of Birmingham 
Jail.210  King explicit called “paradoxical” that a group that so diligently urges obedience to the 
laws outlawing segregation would consciously break the law. He proclaimed the injustice of a 
formal laws that “degrade human personality:” 
 
204 Robert Post identified the inevitability of normative contradictions “because political action in modernity always 
aims at the creation of institutions, and institutions must function according to the rule of law if they are to act fairly 
and effectively.” Robert Post, Leadership in Law Schools, AALS SECTION NEWSLETTER, (2019), available at 
https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/08/leadership-in-law-schools/  .  
205 Amna A. Akbar in Toward a Radical Imagination of Law describes “a central dilemma of liberal law reform 
projects, caught between a commitment to the rule of law and status quo arrangements on the one hand, and the 
desire for substantive justice and social, economic, and political transformation on the other.”  
206 Bartlett, supra note at 845 
207 UNGER supra at 129. 
208 Robert Post, Leadership in Law Schools, AALS SECTION NEWSLETTER, (2019), available at 
https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/08/leadership-in-law-schools/  .  
209 COVER, supra note .  
210 Martin Luther King, Letter from City of Birmingham Jail (1963), available at 
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.  
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An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority 
group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the 
same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is 
willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal.  
The judicialization of rights has the potential both to inscribe inequality into law and “to amplify 
conflict and focus attention on it,” and to “transform physical conflict into verbal disputes” and 
“give public voice and force to people previously ignored, to make conflict audible and 
unavoidable.”211  
Yet, these two conceptions of justice are inextricably linked, even as they are 
contradictory. King also depicted the dual edge character of formal law’s relationship to 
substantive justice: 
[L]aw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in 
this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social 
progress. . .Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be 
opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be 
exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and 
the air of national opinion before it can be cured.212 
King sought justice in both senses of the word. It is only by stepping outside of law to shine a 
light on law’s injustice that the law can claim both to be justice and to advance justice. To 
advance justice in the world requires stepping outside of legality and as currently defined by law 
and legal institutions, both to pursue justice outside law and to move legal institutions closer to a 
sense of justice as it is actually experienced.  
 The third dimension of the justice paradox relates to the contradiction between law as a 
system of values and law as a value proposition.213 The profession operates as both, and law 
schools similarly embody this tension between purpose and prestige. Here too, the relationship 
turns out to be paradoxical. Law’s appeal—to future lawyers, clients, and change agents—
resides in part in its proximity to power and resources; yet that relationship invites cooptation 
and acquiescence in the status quo at the expense of one’s fulfillment.  
 
F. The Interdependence of Adjudicatory and Proactive Lawyering 
Thus, legality and proactive lawyering operate in tension with each other, sometimes to 
the point of directly contradicting or displacing one another. The contradictory elements of 
legalization and adaptive leadership are built into the definition and operation of law. One 
element demands and gives rise to the other. A person cannot effectively practice legality 
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without also engaging the practices associated with proactive lawyering, but the practices of 
legality conflict in significant ways with those required for adaptive leadership. This self-
referential and cycling quality is what makes lawyering paradoxical. The contradictory options 
are interrelated such that the tension will inevitably resurface.214  
How law students and lawyers manage these contradictions will make a big difference to 
their effectiveness as lawyers, their fulfillment, and their connection to advancing justice. The 
next section explores the limits of conventional approaches to navigate this tension.  
 
III. THE PERILS OF PARADOX AVOIDANCE  
The ability to thrive in law school and in the legal profession—and to pursue lawyers’ 
responsibility to advance justice—turns in no small measure on how students and lawyers fare in 
navigating the lawyering paradoxes described in the previous section. Yet for the most part, 
students are left to their own devices to understand and manage these tensions. Law schools 
generally pay little attention to this paradoxical dynamic, its impact on law students, or its 
implications for responding to the clarion call for change. Notwithstanding the growing focus on 
proactive lawyering, many students and lawyers continue find themselves buffeted by the 
demands of legality and proactive lawyering.  
The question for legal education and the legal profession is whether these lawyering 
paradoxes will be experienced as counter-productive—producing vicious cycles, 
disengagement, and dysfunction—or dynamic—fueling learning, transformation, and the 
capacity to navigate complexity. That difference depends at least in part on how individuals, 
contexts, and cultures construct the relationship between legality and proactive lawyering.  
Since attending law school, I have been observing how legal academics, law students, 
and the legal profession (including myself in each of these roles) navigate the tensions between 
legality and proactive lawyering. I have been tracking the strategies and the impact informally, 
by observing how students experience law school, and more systematically by examining 
scholarship about legal education, conducting qualitative research about law students and 
lawyers, and analyzing students’ blog posts about their law school experience.215  
The three approaches to the tensions between legality and proactive lawyering 
resemble common approaches to paradox; they try to escape, resolve, or sidestep the 
lawyering paradoxes identified in the previous section. Research on lawyering seen through 
the lens of the paradox literature suggests that, though these strategies are understandable, 
 
214 Smith and Lewis, supra note, at 387. 
215 See Sturm and Makovi, supra note ; Sturm & Guinier, supra note ; Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier, Learning from 
Conflict: Reflections on Teaching About Race and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 515 (2003); From Gladiators to 
Problem Solvers, supra note XX. I have also coded the blog posts from Lawyering for Change, and identified 
patterns emerging from those posts. In both Lawyer Leadership and Lawyering for Change, students post blogs on a 
weekly basis, inviting reflection about their experience of law and law school, along with their developing theories 
of change.  
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they are counter-productive as ways to equip lawyers and the law to engage in both 
adjudicatory and proactive lawyering. None work to reconcile the lawyering paradoxes, or to 
address the ways that these logics compete and sometimes undermine each other’s effectiveness. 
Paradoxes cannot be avoided or resolved, although they can be managed. They involve a 
“struggle of opposites, with each method of disposing of the conflict giving rise to a new set 
of tensions.”216 When the situation fails to “hold” these contradictions and works instead to 
deny, avoid, or resolve them, or to have them carried by a subset of the community, then “ the 
preconditions for ‘stuckness’ are created.217 They give rise to counterproductive dynamics that 
breed cynicism, polarization, disengagement, and dysfunction. 218  
This section discusses three problematic approaches to lawyering paradoxes: (a) 
crowding out modes of thought in tension with legality, (b) inviting premature or problematic 
resolution of ambivalence and contradictions, and (c) contributing to cynicism about law’s 
relationship to justice.  
  
A. Crowding out proactive lawyering 
 
Problems emerge when legality (like one side of any paradox) “tries to hog the whole 
bed.”219 Although clinical legal education and experiential learning opportunities have 
increased,220 the culture and currency of many law schools remains focused on mastering 
legality.221 In many law schools, the formative first year focuses almost exclusively on 
learning legality. Adjudication remains the default mode of inquiry and practice, and court 
decisions form the backbone of many upper level classes. Most casebooks proceed within 
the logic of legality. For many law students, most of their courses emphasize doctrinal 
analysis. Legality’s modes of thought, motivations, and discourse often dictate how  students 
learn the law even in courses focused on non-adjudicatory settings, such as legislation and 
transactional lawyering.222 Non-adjudicatory modes of thought and practice are referred to 
as “alternative dispute resolution.” Learning to “think like a lawyer” prototypically refers to 
conventional legal reasoning in adjudicatory settings.  223  The default mode of assessment in 
law school (and on the bar exam) prioritizes issue spotting, legal reasoning, and legal 
writing.224 Many law schools grade on a curve, which heightens students’ competitiveness 
 
216 Id.  
217 SMITH AND BERG, supra note, at 15.  
218 Id. at 208.  
219 ELBOW, supra note , at 258.  
220 See Section IV, infra.  
221 The McCrate report, based on a systematic study of legal education, observed that, many law schools prioritize 
legal reasoning skills, and fail to devote attention to proactive lawyering. See MacCrate Report, supra note XX. 
222 Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 
U. PA. L REV. 1564, 1569-71 (1988); Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyers 
as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum,  37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 n.10 (1990). 
223 Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 325 (1995). 
224 Id.  
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and preoccupation with performance over learning.225 Researchers have also documented 
the lasting impact of this equation of lawyering with legality on how people think about 
themselves as lawyers.226 
 
Law schools’ focus on legality at legal education’s defining moments affects the way 
many law students and lawyers think and feel about the competencies and practices related to 
proactive lawyering.227 Legality’s emphasis on the methodology of skepticism reinforces the 
general tendency to value critical thought over creativity and imagination.228 This tendency—to 
remember negatives over positives, to value criticism over appreciative inquiry, to listen with an 
ear toward refuting rather than understanding—exists in any discipline defined by critical and 
logical thinking.229  Many students infer from the pervasiveness of methodological skepticism, 
particularly in the first year when they are forming their identities as lawyers, the idea that other 
modes of thinking do not count as part of thinking like a lawyer.230 Conventional legal reasoning 
treats politics, emotion, and intuition as a departure from logical and rational inquiry, which 
threatens the legitimacy of legal decision-making.231  
Methodological skepticism becomes self-referential—“the mirror through which it judges 
what it is like;” it negates the value of what cannot be understood through that logic.232  The 
emphasis on “thinking like a lawyer” (narrowly defined) leads many students to devalue or 
marginalize modes of thought that fall outside legality. Many students report experiencing a 
dampening of their engagement with creative or imaginative thinking and practice. One student 
in lawyering for change reported:  
Coming into law school, I was really interested in trying to be creative in my approach 
the law and took an expansive view of lawyering; however, I actually arrived in the law 
school environment, that expansive view quickly narrowed down to accepting what 
people told me about law school and being a lawyer and just keeping my head down and 
getting my work done.233   
 
225 See London, supra note XX.  
226 Id.; MERTZ, supra note XX; UNGER, supra note XX.  
227 Rakoff and Minow, supra note, (“The template for legal thinking established in the first year of law school has 
real staying power”). Sturm & Guinier, supra  note , at 96 (“The structure of courses in the first semester . . . 
conveys the impression that appellate litigation and corporate practice constitute law’s core, and that law emerges 
when judicial actors interpret the arguments of lawyers, the policies of legislators, or the decision of 
administrators.”) 
228 See PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN LAWYERS 6-7; Sturm and 
Guinier, id.  
229 Elbow, supra note .  
230 Lesnick, supra note , at 1159. 
231 KISSAM, supra note 
232 See SMITH AND BERG, supra note , at 49-50.  
233 Claire MacLanahan. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424 
45 LAWYERING PARADOXES 25-Oct-19 
 
Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission 
.  
 
Another noted that “I am rewarded for how well I can extract rule of law from cases and apply it 
to a new set of facts. So, after last semester's exams, I have devoted more energy just practicing 
technical method of rule → facts → application.234 
This self-referential pattern can lead students (and faculty) to downplay or abandon 
creative, non-linear modes of thought, even when they had experience prior to law school with 
these methodologies.235 For some this led them to doubt the relevance of abilities that enabled 
them to succeed prior to law school, many of which fall under the umbrella of proactive 
lawyering. Some students interpret learning to think like a lawyer to mean setting aside or 
unlearning other modes of thought, as part of becoming a lawyer.  
I find it interesting just how much this mode of processing seeps into everything we do. 
In many ways, it causes problems we become unused to solving, since the roles we are 
thrown into often call for forward thinking, innovative solutions but our practiced mode 
of analysis is backward looking and self-contained.236  
The methodology of skepticism, with its focus on adjudication and its essentially critical 
stance, thus tends to crowd out the imaginative, forward looking methodologies associated with 
proactive lawyering.237 “The greatest imaginative cost of the canonical style of legal reasoning is 
negative: it fills up the imaginative space in which another way of thinking might take root, and 
it does so in the crucial testing ground on which authoritative ideals meet practical realities.”238  
Students and researchers also report a shift in the way students listen to each other. They 
describe themselves as more likely to listen instrumentally and with the relevant legal categories 
in mind, which draws them away from “the norms and conventions that many members of our 
society, including future clients, use to solve conflicts and moral dilemmas.”239  This 
decontextualization encourages students to treat people as characters in a legal drama. They 
listen for how they can use or refute what they are hearing, and report finding it more difficult to 
listen with the goal of understanding, empathizing, or appreciating the perspective and 
experience of others. They also are more likely to speak to demonstrate their proficiency, prove 
their point, or win an argument. Researchers have documented—and many students reported—
reluctance to ask questions solely out of curiosity or to take the risk of appearing uncertain or, 
even worse, not understanding.  
Research conducted on practicing lawyers shows that the mindset and methodology of 
competition and skepticism invited by legality coalesces into a culture and way of being for 
 
234 Seofin Park.  
235 One law student observed: The “softer” leadership skills that I have been learning and building for the past few 
years working, but also prior to that in undergrad, seem less relevant for law school success. (The fact that my first 
inclination was to refer to leadership skills as "soft" even though we have learned about concrete methods and 
processes to improve our leadership capacity exemplifies the ways in which this paradox is playing out in my 
education.)” CB.  
236 K.J. [insert name], [insert title of blog post], Lawyer Leadership Course Blog (Insert date).. 
237 Id. One advice book, based on interviews and surveys of law students, exhorts law studets to understand that 
“you are being trained as a technician, not an innovator.” YOUNG, supra note XX, at 32. 
238 UNGER, supra note , at 106.  
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many lawyers. Although there is evidence of a “lawyer personality” that is “distinguished by an 
ethic of justice rather than an ethic of care,” predisposed to be skeptical, or to see the glass as 
half empty rather than half full,240 there is also evidence that these tendencies are engendered at 
least in part by legal education,241 as well as by the prevailing legal culture in which one 
practices.242  
Students in Lawyer Leadership and Lawyering for Change have commented extensively 
on the significance of the mindset they associate with law and law school for their learning and 
role definition. They describe coming in with an orientation of exploration, learning, and risk 
taking, and confronting experiences in and out of the classroom that undercut their orientation 
toward growth and learning from failure. This fosters a tendency to avoid asking questions if 
they are uncertain or confused, and to treat performance in law school, and particularly failure, as 
defining of their ability. This pattern tracks findings of more systematic empirical studies of law 
student experience.243 
The predominance of legality’s mindset, motivations, and relationships thus cultivates a 
collective fixed mindset—a marked departure from how many law students describe their 
mindset as undergraduates or in pre-law school employment. Research also documents that that 
women, people of color, and first generation students may experience this dynamic with 
particular intensity.244  
The choice to prioritize legality over proactive lawyering—clearest in the first year of 
law school—carries over to how many students experience themselves throughout law school 
and their legal careers. There is evidence that crowding out proactive lawyering may play a 
contributing role in the widespread dissatisfaction and unhappiness that many law students and 
lawyers experience.245 How many times have you heard a practitioner say, “I am a recovering 
lawyer,” as if lawyering were a disease? Or describe having left the practice of law, when they 
continue to play roles that fall squarely under the umbrella of proactive lawyering? In an article 
 
240 Larry Richard, Herding Cats: The Lawyer Personality Revealed, 29 Legal Mgt 1 (2002). It is worth noting that 
Richard’s findings are based on studies primarily of partners in large private firms and corporate law departments. 
241 See Lawrence S. Krieger and Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy? A Data-Driven Prescription to 
Redefining Professional Success, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 554 (2015); Robert Eli Rosen, Christine E. Parker, and 
Viveke Lehmann Nielson, The Framing Effects of Professionalism: Is There a Lawyer Cast of Mind? Lessons from 
Compliance Programs, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 297 (2012).  
242 See Gilson and Mnookin, supra note , at  
243 Bonita London, Geraldine Downey, and Shauna Mace, Psychological Theories of Educational Engagement: A 
Multi-Method Approach to Studying Individual Engagement and Institutional Change, 60 VAND. L. REV. 455 
(2007). 
244 See Lani Guinier and Michelle Fine, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE (1997); London, Downey, and Mace, supra note , at ; Elena Rodriguez, Student Thriving at Columbia Law 
School: An Asset-Based Study of Climate for Student Engagement and Support (2016)(unpublished paper); Sturm, 
supra note .  
245 See Martin E.P. Seligman, Paul R. Verkuil, and Terry H. Kang, Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. (2001); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law 
Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV SCI & L. 261 (2004); Patrick J. 
Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy and Unethical Profession, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424 
47 LAWYERING PARADOXES 25-Oct-19 
 
Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission 
.  
 
written in 1990, Howard Lesnick summarized the impact of the partial quality of the truth 
reflected by legality and the pyramiding of its mutually reinforcing assertions: 
Taken as a whole, they systematically discourage students (and faculty as well) from 
inquiring into unspoken premises, whether about the legal system, the larger social order, 
or the role of lawyers; they inhibit the experience of choice, of human responsibility for 
the social constructs that we call the law and the legal profession; they are—among other, 
perhaps more serious vices—profoundly anti-intellectual.246 
By “hogging the bed,” legality crowds out the practice and legitimacy of proactive 
lawyering, shapes the choices students make about their courses and careers, and leads people to 
pathologize lawyering. It leads some law students to disengage from law school and leave the 
law when they conclude that the most important aspects of themselves are not part of being a 
lawyer.247  
 
B. Inviting premature or problematic resolution of ambivalence and contradictions 
The prevailing strategy for introducing proactive lawyering to law schools that have 
prioritized legality could be called “add and stir.” Many law schools now supplement their core 
curriculum with a menu of discrete offerings that provide students with the opportunity to learn 
various proactive lawyering skills and practices, usually starting in the second year. Proactive 
lawyering competencies such as negotiation, listening, problem solving, collaboration, and 
persuasive communication receive attention in a variety of courses ranging from alternative 
dispute resolution to human rights, to problem solving and transactional lawyering, alongside 
legal clinics. In the last twenty years, law schools have increased offerings such as clinics, 
externships, human rights programs, alternative dispute resolution, problem solving, and 
transactional lawyering. Some law schools have introduced required courses that expose law 
students to proactive lawyering practices and methodologies. Design thinking has entered the 
law school space and is an increasing focus of pedagogical and scholarly attention. Law schools 
have recently shown interest in leadership learning, which emphasizes many of the competencies 
required for proactive lawyering.248   
This approach of supplementing legality with proactive lawyering resembles what paradox 
scholars call “splitting.”249  This strategy assigns responsibility for a less valued activity to a 
separate and lower status domain. Proactive lawyering pedagogy often occurs in distinct realms, 
apart from mainstream law school offerings focused on legality and with little opportunity to 
 
246 Lesnick, supra note , at 1182.  
247 See Schiltz, supra note XX. The ABA has recently recognized the urgency of addressing the issue of lawyers’ 
wellbeing. See National Task Force on Lawyer Well-Being, The Path to Lawyer Well-Being: Practicel 
Recommenations for Positive Change (August 2017), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/ThePathToLawyerWellBeingReportRevFINAL.pdf 
(last visited August 16, 2019). 
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integrate these experiences. Different people occupy the spaces focused on legality and proactive 
lawyering—often with different status, physical locations, and communities of practice. These 
two modes of thought and practice remain largely separate, often with non-lawyers, specialized 
clinical faculty, adjunct faculty, or administrators focusing on cultivating proactive lawyering 
skills, while faculty teaching the mainstream conventional law classes maintain their pedagogy 
oriented around teaching and critiquing legality. This approach of assigning separate spheres for 
legality and proactive lawyering also occurs in practice groups and judicial systems.250  
For many students, courses emphasizing proactive lawyering comprise a small part of their 
overall law school experience. As of August 2014, the American Bar Association requires law 
students to take 6 credits of experiential learning as part of their course of study, out of a total of 
84 credits required for graduation—7 percent of their total education.251 Although some law 
professors have begun experimenting with integrating forms of proactive lawyering into 
conventional pedagogy, many non-clinical faculty members continue to organize their courses 
around casebooks that prioritize learning legal reasoning and parsing appellate decisions as the 
primary text for learning the law.”252  
Problems arise from segregating, overlooking or underappreciating the tensions between 
proactive lawyering and the powerful pull of legality. The siloed and lower status nature of 
proactive lawyering makes it difficult for students to experience proactive lawyering as a 
coherent methodology with its own rigor and practices extending beyond a particular course or 
content area. Students struggle to make sense of the conflicting medium and messages promoted 
in different quarters of the legal academy and the profession. The tension and ambivalence 
produced by the lawyering paradoxes pervade the law school experience (and carry over into 
practice).253 Unless they are addressed directly, these paradoxes are likely to invite familiar (and 
counter- productive) patterns to escape the ambiguity, discomfort and uncertainty that 
accompany living in the tension.254  
Faculty might unwittingly contribute to this counter-productive cycling, by introducing 
methodologies of possibility alongside legality, without making explicit the assumptions and 
practices of either, discussing the impact of one on the other, or equipping students to navigate 
the contradictions they experience. They might teach the competencies associated with proactive 
lawyering without relating them to law or lawyering. Design thinking, mediation, 
experimentalism, or entrepreneurship may proceed legality as problematic or irrelevant, and fail 
to engage with legality’s continuing role (like it or not).  
 
250 See Gardner, supra note XX.  
251 American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Revised Standards for 
Approval of Law Schools, Standard § 303(a)(3)(Aug. 2014), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-
2019ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-chapter3.pdf. 
252 HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, supra note XX. 
253 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note ; Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday 
Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67   . 739 (1998); Note, The Paradox of Prosecution, 142 HARV. L. REV. 748 (2018). 
254 See Kahane, supra note; SMITH AND LEWIS, supra note XX. 
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For example, business school courses sometimes proceed in the law school with the same 
materials and pedagogy used in business schools. Business school cases used in law schools 
were developed for the corporate setting, and do not address the situations lawyers face, or how 
proactive lawyering practices relate to conventional lawyering roles. Design thinking instructs 
students to cooperate and to place critique aside, often without accounting for tensions and 
barriers erected by methodological skepticism.255 Materials used in law school classes (including 
my own) to cultivate leadership and build the capacity for difficult conversations contain blanket 
critique of evaluation, comparisons, and judgment, without situating those critiques in lawyers’ 
responsibility for engaging in these practices as part of their roles. They may shy away from 
grappling with how proactive lawyering will be affected by its adjudicatory twin  or denigrate 
the skills that legality requires.”256   
Students may try to split their experience, by moving back and forth between the more 
conventional law school activities and those that emphasize proactive lawyering. Some can 
navigate this seesaw between proactive lawyering and legality without losing one or the other. 
Research and experience show, however, that many students are deeply ambivalent about the 
law, their relationship to it, and the pathway to their success and striving. Law school does little 
to provide them with the tools to sustain their ambivalence, which is itself both painful and 
difficult to sustain. Many studies document students’ ambivalent relationship to power, 
adversarialism, prestige, and social justice.257 Students report feeling torn by the competing 
pressures and mixed messages they experience in law school. In the absence of strategies and 
supports enabling them to live with and make sense of these contradictions, the ambivalent group 
is inclined choose one over the other, often before they are ready to make such a decision. 
Evidence suggests that this rush to resolution happens quite early in students law school career.  
Scholarly work, including my own, exhibits this same tendency to sidestep the paradoxical 
relationship between legality and proactive lawyering. They have proposed hybrids or substitutes 
for conventional legality, without adequately addressing the ongoing tension between 
adjudicatory and proactive lawyering built into the court’s role as an intermediary and lawyers’ 
involvement in intermediation. My work on second generation discrimination, for example, 
simply cast the court in the role of catalyst and problem solver, without addressing how legality’s 
approach to motivation and justice might limit courts’ capacity to serve as an effective 
intermediary. After acknowledging critics’ worries about cosmetic compliance and cooptation,258 
I downplayed the prevalence of these problems without confronting their roots in paradox, much 
less strategizing about how to navigate those dualities.259  
Other new governance scholars have shared this tendency to overlook or underappreciate 
how legality’s methodology will continue to affect the way new forms of problem solving 
 
255 SEE MARGARET HAGAN, DESIGN THINKING AND LAW: A PERFECT MATCH, THE INNOVATION ISSUE, JANUARY 2014.\ 
256 ROSENBERG, supra at .  
257 See Bliss, Guinier, Fine, and Bailin, supra note ; Lesnick, supra note ; Mertz, supra note passim; Sturm and 
Makovi, supra note , at  
258 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(2006); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO STATE L. J. 323 (2009). 
259 See Sturm, supra note XX.  
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unfold.260 By assuming that the processes themselves will take care of this, the new governance 
scholars (myself included) fail to deal with the predictable ways that power differentials and 
differences in capacity or willingness to engage will undermine new governance regime’s 
effective operation.261 In retrospect, I see that some new governance critics also underappreciated 
the paradoxical nature of law, leading them sometimes to advocate one side of the paradox over 
the other, or to misread or stylize my efforts to create a hybrid approach.262 
In Violence and the Word, Robert Cover warned of the dangers of downplaying or 
overlooking the impact of legality’s relationship to violence on law’s effort to generate norm 
communities. That tension to some degree is inescapable. Robert Cover expresses these 
contradictions in their most stark form, observing that, “pain and death destroy the world that 
“interpretation” calls up.263 “Judges kill the diverse legal traditions that compete with the 
State.”264 By failing to attend to the lawyering paradoxes, law schools similarly squelch capacity 
to navigate ambiguity and stay connected to what they care about. 
 
C. Critique detached from transformative possibilities: Contributing to cynicism about law’s 
relationship to justice 
Many faculty and students alike are well aware of many of these limitations built into the 
conventional lawyering. Critical analysis of case law happens regularly in mainstream law 
school classrooms. “Thinking like a lawyer” includes learning to identify the flaws in courts’ 
reasoning, weighing competing policy considerations, and understanding the limits of courts as a 
way of addressing complex problems lacking clear solutions. Indeed, this form of critique is part 
and parcel of effective doctrinal teaching.265  These include critiques of the reasoning or results 
of particular court decisions or more crosscutting critiques of legality’s operation, drawing on 
legal realism, critical legal studies, critical race theory, feminist theory, interdisciplinary studies, 
and experimentalism.  
Many faculty expose the contradictions between law and justice, but do not equip 
students or the legal system to build an affirmative way of grappling with them. Often, this 
critical lens identifies the limits of legality, but does not incorporate proactive lawyering 
methodologies and mindsets into the overall pedagogy and practice. Critique remains within the 
mindset and method of critique and argumentation, without inviting or equipping students to 
 
260 See, e.g., Sabel and Simon, supra note XX; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2003). 
261 As Amy Cohen noted, “A collaborative social project that aims to challenge extant power hierarchies by 
enhancing the capacities of stakeholders to act on their own behalf may evade a critical assessment of the ways in 
which negotiations skills and strategies (and the interests they produce) are already inflected with the effects of 
inequality. Cohen, supra note , at 543-544 (negotiations meet new governance). 
262 Bagenstos, supra note XX; NeJaime, supra note XX (reading the move to include more collaborative forms of 
interaction as inconsistent with and thus a rejection of lawyers’ more adversarial roles)). 
263 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1602 (1986).  
264 Cover, supra note XX, at 40-44.  
265 Post, supra at .  
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view their lawyering roles to include advancing values and developing innovative and effective 
solutions.266 As one student in Lawyering for Change noted:  
During orientation, law students are urged to never let go of their values, to use their 
education to go forth and make change they want to see, etc. But these values are by no 
means reflected in our classes, though to be fair I do think that almost all my professors 
do a really good job of pushing all of us to be critical of the systems we study. The main 
issue is that the type of thinking essential to leadership values aren't really the ones that 
are fostered or tested in class, and I don't really even know how that would look.267 
Students report that they lack venues and opportunities for processing their doubts and 
ambivalence. In many law schools, the mainstream curriculum does not systematically focus on 
the non-judicial forms and venues that lawyers occupy and that law engages. Nor has legal 
education generally structured the curriculum to afford students opportunities to reflect on their 
own. We have not yet developed the rigorous methodologies of possibility into our thinking and 
teaching. The relentless press of work, combined with the pressure to project competence, 
discourages students from engaging in much needed reflection about the contradictions they 
face. Some of this is a function of the court-centeredness of so much of legal education.  
So, faced with glaring disconnects between law and justice, students are left to their own 
devices to figure out what to do with those critiques. When students experience this critique 
without also engaging what can be done about it, students become cynical about the law and its 
relationship to justice. This leads some to disengage from law school and from the possibility of 
achieving justice through law. Students anguish about the disconnect between their values and 
the law, between legal definitions of justice and justice as it is experienced in the world (as did I 
when I was in law school).  
If students lack regular opportunities to engage with other and with faculty about these 
emotions and concerns, and to grapple seriously with ways to have positive impact in the face of 
legality’s limitations, the paradoxes turn into frustration, discouragement, and for some, 
disengagement.  
We all seem to feel similarly that the law degree has the potential to empower us to make 
meaningful change and also forces us into a rigid system with a specialized skillset that 
makes it feel more difficult to make these changes. I sometimes wonder if we just have to 
accept that we're going into a very structured world or if accepting that just makes us 
more complicit/unmotivated to actually make these changes. 268 
As Duncan Kennedy noted in his pathbreaking critique, first year law students have no way to 
think about law “in a way that will allow one to enter into it, to criticize without utterly rejecting 
it, and to manipulate it without self-abandonment to their system of thinking and doing.” Students 
are immediately told that “their success or failure largely turns on swiftly learning to use the new 
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language,” leaving no time to find the political substance of the rules they are studying. This can 
lead to cynicism about the law, and giving up on the law as a way to advance justice.  
 For non-believers in law’s neutrality, which includes many law students, the cognitive 
dissonance between legal doctrine and their sense of fairness, their politics, and their values leads 
them to question law’s legitimacy, to become cynical about law’s relationship to justice, and for 
some, to disengage. However, as the next section explores, the paradox literature offers a way to 
move forward in way that treats these contradictions as a source of creative friction, rather than 
as a self-defeating cycle.  
 
IV. EMBRACING LAWYERING PARADOXES 
 
This journey through the lens of paradox shifts attention toward figuring out how legal 
education and legal practice can foster creative tension between legality and proactive lawyering, 
rather than have one polarity crowd out, confuse, or undermine the other. Is there a way to equip 
law students and lawyers to hold that tension? Can individuals and systems simultaneously learn 
and practice the critical, categorical, formal, and judgment-based logic of legality and the 
creative, improvisational, relationship building logic of proactive lawyering? Are there ways to 
facilitate students’ and faculty’s engagement with lawyers’ roles as catalysts for justice and 
facilitators of democracy when the institutions and politics demonstrably thwart those values?  
There is much at stake in the way law schools and the legal profession takes up this 
challenge. Many both inside and outside the academy and the legal profession have expressed 
deep concern about law’s legitimacy: whether we will can have legal and political institutions 
that will uphold the rule of law, advance justice, and work to revitalize a polarized and unjust 
democracy. Law students will have to assume responsibility for these challenges, and law 
schools bear the responsibility for equipping them to do so. They cannot succeed without 
learning to navigate paradox. 
This section shares what I have learned from my decades of study and struggle. The 
Article draws on the insights gleaned from paradox scholars, as well from the “positive deviants” 
among us in law schools. Positive deviants are the outliers who, working with the same resources 
as everyone else, have been successful in addressing a tough problem where most others have 
failed.269  
There is much to be learned from the positive deviants who have been experimenting 
with a third way to approach the tension between legality and proactive lawyering. Because of 
their focus on integrating theory and practice, clinical faculty have been actively grappling with 
these challenges for decades, usually in their separate spaces. Some non-clinical faculty have 
figured out ways to incorporate proactive lawyering into teaching conventional subjects like 
contracts, civil procedure, and corporations. Some students come into law school with 
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experience navigating these kinds of tensions or with a strongly developed sense of purpose and 
a community to keep them grounded. Those that did were more likely to report that they could 
set these practices aside and focus on legality without shifting their overall mindset and practice. 
A few law schools have from their inception been organized to integrate legality and proactive 
lawyering into students’ learning from the beginning of their law school experience.270 
Most have done this through experiments within a classroom, program, or project. Some 
law schools are experimenting with more institutionally rooted experiments, and a few more law 
schools have recently undertaken to build this dynamic tension into their mission. Many of these 
innovators are proceeding in isolation, without connecting in any systematic way to others who 
have undertaken innovation. Most have not recognized the value in naming and engaging 
explicitly with the paradoxical nature of their practice.  
A crucial move enabling these positive outliers to navigate paradox entails re-centering 
the focus from law to lawyering. Even when legal strictures tether conflicts to legality, lawyering 
have much a much wider range of motion. They can move back and forth between the spaces 
employing legality and proactive lawyering, and invent new locations and institutions that link 
back to those more constrained by history and structure. This shift from law to lawyering also 
enables law students and legal practitioners to define “thinking like a lawyer” to include the 
methodologies and practices of both legality and proactive lawyering, and to reconceive law to 
include norms and forms of accountability generated through participatory practice.271 
Lawyering can bridge these paradoxes by creating provisional, experimental projects and spaces 
that link these contradictions and, where possible, transform both sides of the paradoxical 
relationship. By framing students’ learning in terms of lawyering, the possibilities for navigating 
paradox become real and actionable. 
Drawing on the paradox literature, my experience in teaching and action research, and the 
practices of positive deviants, this Section offers three strategies for forging dynamic tension 
between legality and proactive lawyering: (1) holding paradox by observing, understanding, and 
building awareness and acceptance of their operation; (2) building capacities that enable people, 
groups, and systems to hold paradox, and (3) designing and organizing experiments, spaces, and 
practices to facilitate and, in some instances, to transcend paradox. 
 
A. Holding Paradox: Naming, Observing, and Understanding Paradoxes 
One of the most surprising and encouraging insights from the paradox literature involves 
the power of simply seeing the conflicting aspects of lawyering through the lens of paradox. 
Research suggests that seeing those tensions as paradoxes actually changes how we experience 
 
270 CUNY Law School is widely acknowledged as a curricular innovator that has from its inception undertaken to 
integrate theory and practice, focuses on the relationship between law and lawyering, and engages students regularly 
in reflection about the tensions and value choices facing lawyers. See Barbara Bezdek, Charles Halperin, Howard 
Lesnick. A review of its core pedagogy and philosophy suggests that the school creates the context and capacities to 
wrestle directly with the tensions between legality and proactive lawyering.  
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them.272 This shift in meaning enables a move from trying to resolve a dilemma that may not be 
resolvable to sitting with observed contradictions, accepting that they coexist, trying to 
understand how they operate, and inquiring about whether we can resolve them or must instead 
learn how to work through them. “‘Working through’ does not imply eliminating or resolving 
paradox, but constructing a more workable certainty that enables change.’’273 This shift occurs 
by creating opportunities for noticing, observing, and accepting the paradoxical relationship 
between legality and proactive lawyering when that duality surfaces, with specific attention to 
the opposing yet interdependent practices and mindsets called for by each and the potential links 
between them. The idea is to foster actors’ active awareness of the duality by noticing a paradox 
without attempting to resolve or resist it, but instead observing it in practice. This reframing 
move serves to enable people to sit with the conflict, and learn their way into the process of 
maintaining both.  
Peter Elbow provides some insight into why “searching for contradiction and affirming 
both sides can allow you to find both the limitations of the system in which you are working and 
a way to break out of it.”274  Using Chaucer as an illustration, Elbow notes that by “setting up a 
polar opposition and affirming both sides,” we “lay the framework for a broader frame of 
reference, ensuring that neither side can ‘win.’” The seeming dilemma can be arranged “so that 
we can only be satisfied by taking the larger view.”275  
For example, one study observed successful chamber music groups built the capacity to 
name and accept the paradoxical relationship between their need to individuate and express 
autonomy as a musician, on the one hand, and the need to blend, cooperate, and come together 
around a shared musical idea, on the other.276 Researchers learned that members of successful 
string quartets came to understand the upside and the downside of either pole. Acceptance helps 
members avoid unresolvable debates that sparked vicious cycles breeding distrust, and enabling 
them to “play through” paradox by recommitting to shared overarching goals, expecting each 
other to express contradictory needs, and focusing on their intense tasks. This framework might 
help researchers address what tensions exist, why they may fuel reinforcing cycles, and how 
actors may manage paradoxes to foster change and understanding. 
This section first provides readers with some conceptual tools developed by scholars and 
practitioners to help notice and understand paradox, and then shares some lessons learned from 
efforts to introduce paradox to teaching and scholarship. 
  
1. Conceptual tools for holding paradox 
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The paradox literature (both scholarly and popular) offers some useful tools for moving 
back and forth between two opposing yet related concepts. Concrete illustrations of the process 
of shifting perspective offer one such tool. For example, Barry Johnson explores the image 
below as a way of helping us alternate “figure” and “ground” to see two conflicting images 
embedded in a single image, which cannot actually be observed at the same time.  
 
Is the picture above a goblet or two faces? The answer is both, depending on what you identify 
as foreground vs. background. Johnson offers the practice of shifting back and forth, as well as 
the concept of breathing in and out, to show that you cannot see from both perspectives at the 
same moment but you can shift your gaze back and forth to experience both. He also 
differentiates accuracy from completeness as a helpful way to understand paradox, as well as the 
dynamics that contribute to vicious cycling.277  The “faces or goblet” exercise exemplifies how 
metaphor offers a way into paradoxical thinking:   
What is most important about metaphor is that there must be a contradiction—a bit of 
non-sense—before you can have a metaphor. . . The metaphor does not provide a new 
system or synthesis, it only provides an abutting of opposing elements. Thus, metaphor 
can be described a refusal to synthesize, an insistence on letting the contradiction stand: 
simply to live with the contradiction and try to let it reverberate as a way of doing justice 
to the complexity of its subject.278  
The literature also offers some conceptual tools to help in seeing and holding paradox. 
One tool is a Vent diagram, which is a diagram of the overlap of two statements that appear to be 
true and appear to be contradictory, with the overlapping middle purposely left undefined: 
 
 
277 JOHNSON, supra note , at 21, 43. 
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Venting is used in two senses: as “an emotional release, an outlet for our anger, frustration, 
despair”, and as a vent that “enables stale, suffocating air to flow out, it allows new fresh air to 
cycle in and through.”279 By styling these tensions as unlabeled vent diagrams, we get to “a) 
actively confront binary thinking and b) imagine what’s actually in the overlap every time we see 
and feel the vent.” Making vent diagrams “helps us recognize and reckon with contradictions and 
keep imagining and acting from the intersections and overlaps.”280  They concretely illustrate the 
value of creating a third space or vantage point, not occupied by either pole of the paradox, from 
which you can observe the operation of both. 
Another tool, offered by Barry Johnson, is a Polarity Map, which identifies the upside 
and the downside of each pole, and provides a guide for moving through the quadrants to 
maximize creative tension and minimize resistance:281   
 
L+ Positive outcomes from 
focusing on legality 
R+ Positive outcomes from 
focusing on proactive lawyering 
L- Negative outcomes from 
focusing on legality 
R- Negative outcomes from 
focusing on proactive lawyering 
 
Cutting across all these tools is a focus on reflection. Ronald Heifetz offers the idea of 
“going to the balcony,” which involves imagining that you are simultaneously on a dance floor 
and observing yourself and other on the dance floor from a balcony perched some distance 
above. “Achieving a “balcony perspective” means “taking yourself out of the dance, even if only 
for a moment,” returning to the dance floor, and then moving back and forth from the balcony to 
the dance floor, with the goal of coming as close as possible to being in both places at the same 
time. 282 Ellen Schall invites people to “learn to love the swamp”—moving back and forth 
between the solid ground of legality and the mucky yet potent swamp where adaptive problems 
reside, and to use reflective practice as the vehicle enabling that process. Reflective practice 
involves “learning-in the midst of rapidly changing and constantly challenging situations-to be 
self-aware, to understand oneself personally and in role; to be conscious of the impact of the self 
on others, and others on self; to develop a ‘theory of action’ in a particular situation that is 
testable and adjustable; and finally, to build theory from across one's own practice, theory that is 
generalizable and available for testing by others.”283 
 
279 Vent Digrams, available at https://www.ventdiagrams.com/vision-and-values. I am indebted to sujatha baliga for 
introducing me (along with my Lawyering for Change class) to Vent Diagrams.  
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Although they do not necessarily use the language of paradox, legal scholars of different 
stripes have offered various conceptual tools that help in paying attention to when paradoxes 
arise and what impact they have.284 Robert Scott identifies “the paradox of context which lies at 
the heart of the binary choice between the desert and the swamp. . . Without context, no legal 
rule can be applied, but with nothing but context no legal rule can be found.”285 Mari Matsuda 
offers the concept of multiple consciousness as jurisprudential method—the ability to work 
within a particular viewpoint and then “shift out it for purposes of critique, analysis, and 
strategy” as well as to “search for the pathway to a just world.”286 Roberto Unger proposes that 
we identify the shaping influence of fundamental institutions and beliefs while also 
acknowledging the replaceable and ramshackle, although often resilient character of these 
formative contexts.” 287 Robert Mnookin identifies three tensions inherent in negotiation, noting 
that the problem-solving negotiator cannot make these disappear. The first step in the process of 
learning to managing these tensions is to pay attention to when they arise and what impact they 
have.288 
 
2. Lessons from the field 
 
The power of simply noticing paradox resonates with my own observation and 
experience in my teaching and research. In Lawyer Leadership, students have concretely 
demonstrated the impact of simply offering the framework of paradox as a way to understand the 
relationship between legality and leadership. In their reflections and an anonymous survey, many 
students described the paradox frame for lawyer leadership as paradigm-shifting in their self-
conception, their choice to pursue law, and their path to success and thriving as lawyers.289 These 
students had been stuck in a dilemma about how to choose between prestige and purpose, 
lawyering and social justice, cooperative and adversarial roles, and professional identity and 
personal growth. The idea of holding both shifted the questions they asked themselves, enhanced 
the quality of their reflections, and gave them tools to choose how they think, relate to classmates 
and material, and express emotions and needs.  
I have also experimented with heightening awareness of the paradoxical relationship 
between legality and proactive lawyering in mainstream law classes. In Civil Procedure, for 
example, I now keep an eye out for situations where formal legal doctrine or practice implicates 
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proactive lawyering practices, mindsets, and relationships. I have introduced the idea of paradox 
at the points where cooperation and competition have to operate simultaneously,290 or where 
there is a tension between students’ sense of justice and the law’s definition of justice. These 
opportunities actually permeate even the most conventional civil procedure class. When these 
contradictions arise, rather than simply bracketing them and moving on (as I have done in the 
past), I invite the students to identify the multiple and conflicting meaning of due process, the 
requirements to collaborate and mediate before parties can call upon the court to sanction an 
opposing party. I provide opportunities in and out of class for students to reflect about the roles 
they might occupy, and what kinds of questions might they ask or relationships might they build 
in each of those roles.  
That exercise gives rise to questions that push students to identify and grapple with the 
paradoxes: How might those roles and modes of thought conflict? How might you manage that 
conflict? What challenges might you face? Where in your legal education will you have the 
opportunity to focus more deeply on the critical proactive lawyering skills? When justice defined 
by the courts starkly contradicts students’ (and often the judge’s stated) conception of justice, the 
paradox idea has also helped give students a way be both inside and outside conventional legal 
analysis. We can explore, even if superficially, what other venues, roles, and practices might be 
part of an effort to advance substantive as well as formal justice, provide a space for students to 
draw on their prior experience, and  concretely identify when and where students can learn in 
greater depth about proactive lawyering.. This strategy enables students to see early on that 
thinking like a lawyer actually involves multiple ways of thinking, including mastering 
traditional legal reasoning as well as connecting it to other ways of thinking, even when the 
primary focus of the class is on legality.  
My effort to introduce paradox in the classroom has been informed by the innovative 
teaching practice of my colleague, Elizabeth Emens. Professor Emens teaches Contracts, and 
Law, Justice, and Reflective Practice, along with co-teaching Lawyer Leadership. She uses a 
variety of teaching tools to enable students to hold onto their sense of purpose and commitment 
to advancing justice, even as they learn to think and speak like lawyers in the more conventional 
sense of the word. Professor Emens has developed a variety of innovative techniques for holding 
these contradictions in the classroom, including: requiring students keep an intellectual journal, 
reflecting regularly about the relationship between the normative understandings of the court and 
their own normative understandings, understanding the nature students’ objections and how they 
would communicate them most effectively, and using various mindfulness strategies (sometimes 
without naming them as such) to increase awareness and create space for values and emotion.291 
I have also seen how the concept of paradox can be a helpful framework for rethinking 
legal, regulatory, and institutional design. For example, the paradox framework has helped me 
rethink some of my earlier work, much of which was framed around resolving dilemmas or 
 
290 These situations happen throughout civil legal process, and are built into the federal rules. See, e.g., F.R.C.P. 16, 
26, 37 & 68. 
291 Professor Emens is writing an article called “To Speak Like a Lawyer: Voice, Engagement, and Reflection in 
Legal Pedagogy,” which lays out the themes and strategies she uses to equip them to hold the contradictions built in 
to legal practice, and to  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424 
59 LAWYERING PARADOXES 25-Oct-19 
 
Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission 
.  
 
finding both/and solutions to problems that were not amenable to resolution through judicial 
fiat.292 My work sought to avoid the limits of legal process as a means of addressing second 
generation discrimination or similarly complex problems by using a deliberative, problem-
solving process to generate the legal norms that would be enforced by the court. Subsequent 
work showed that the conflicts and tensions between formal legal process and adaptive 
leadership process remained, and frequently led scholars to characterize the work as advancing 
one prong of the duality at the expense of the other. The paradox frame now trains my attention 
on how, when, and where to maintain both.293 
There is thus value in identifying paradox as a conceptual frame, and cultivating dialogue 
among people experiencing different aspects of the duality. This can be done both in spaces 
understood to be grounded in methodological skepticism and those grounded in methodological 
possibility.  
 
B. Building the Capacity to Navigate Paradoxical Concepts and Practices 
 
Although recognizing lawyering paradoxes when they arise constitutes an important first 
step, it is not enough to equip students and lawyers to construct a dynamic tension between 
legality and proactive lawyering. This capacity is a learned skill, and one that calls for a high 
level of complexity of mind.294 The paradox literature provides a foundation for building a 
lexicon of competencies that lawyers require to navigate this tension.  
This Section sketches out competencies needed to navigate the lawyering paradoxes, 
along with illustrative strategies for cultivating those competencies in law school. Going into 
depth about how to develop these competencies is beyond the scope of this article. But this 
framework hopefully provides a roadmap for building these competencies and, as a first, step, 
making them a central part of what law schools seek to cultivate.  
 
1. Identifying competencies related to managing paradoxes 
 
 Commentators have provided different but overlapping concepts for the capacity to hold 
paradox. Peter Elbow begins with the capacity “to gain as many different and conflicting 
knowings as possible: 
People who are good at this seem to call upon some subtle tact, judgment, or intuition. I 
think they are using a metaphorical, analogical, Gestalt-finding ability. They are good at 
maintaining contradictory points of view simultaneously and at living with the 
 
292 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note XX [Resolving the Remedial Dilemma]; From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers, supra 
note XX; Sturm, supra note XX. 
293 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note XX; Susan Sturm, Advancing Equality in and through Legal Institutions: A 
Paradoxical Approach (work in progress).  
294 See ANDERSON AND ADAMS, supra note XX; HEIFETZ, supra note XX. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424 
60 LAWYERING PARADOXES 25-Oct-19 
 
Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission 
.  
 
contradictory points of view simultaneously and at living with ambiguity in order to 
refrain from premature resolution.295 
The ability to hold paradox calls upon lawyers to develop what Lisa Lahey and Robert 
Kegan call a self-transforming mind: a way of making meaning which requires the ability to: 
“step back from and reflect on the limits of our own ideology or personal authority; see that any 
one system or self-organization is in some way partial or incomplete;  be friendlier toward 
contradiction and opposites; and seek to hold on to multiple systems rather than projecting all but 
one onto the other.”296  
Adam Kahane draw on Keats’ concept of negative capability, also suggested by Elizabeth 
Emens, to “maintain equanimity in a conflictual, uncomfortable situation where we don’t know 
how things we turn out, or when, or even if we will succeed. The poet John Keats called this 
“negative capability, which he defined as ‘being capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, and 
doubts without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.” 297 The capacity to navigate 
competing forces requires “conflict optimality: the ability to respond optimally in conflict by 
navigating between different or competing motives and emotions and by combining different 
approaches to conflict to achieve desired outcomes.”298 
 
2. Cultivating the capacity to hold paradox 
 
The paradox literature has identified a set of strategies and capacities that can increase the 
capacity of individuals, groups, and organizations to sit with the accompanying complexity, 
emotional disruption, and uncertainty. Many of these are process strategies demand processual 
responses.299   
 
a. Reframing 
One strand of research finds that developing common and expansive goals, which place 
contradictions within a wider context, help actors accept paradox. That overarching goal can 
provide frameworks that link the two conflicting modes of thought, as well as the motivation to 
stay engaged in the face of tension. Elbow draws on his reading of Chaucer to illustrate how 
paradox can contribute to reframing: “By setting up a polar opposition and affirming both sides, 
 
295 Id. at 242. 
296 ROBERT KEGAN AND LISA LASKOW LAHEY, IMMUNITY TO CHANGE: HOW TO OVERCOME IT AND UNLOCK THE 
POTENTIAL IN YOURSELF AND YOUR ORGANIZATION 17 (2009).  
297 KAHANE, supra note , at 81, quoting JOHN KEATS, THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS AND LETTERS OF JOHN 
KEATS 277 (Boston).  
298 Peter T. Coleman, Conflict Intelligence and Systemic Wisdom: Meta-Competencies for Engaging Conflict in a 
Complex, Dynamic World, 34 NEGOTIATION J. 7 (2018).  
299 Smith and Tracey, supra note, at 459.  
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he lays the foundation for a broader frame of reference, ensuring that neither side can win. He 
arranges the dilemma so that we can only be satisfied by taking the larger view.”300  
Framing is a skill that can be cultivated. The concept of braiding, introduced by Charles 
Sabel, Robert Scott, and Ronald Gilson, offers one example of a reframe that enables legal actors 
to link together cooperative and compliance strategies without losing the character of either. 
Another example from my own work is the effort to reframe equality interventions as a way to 
navigate a paradox that has previously been understood as a dilemma of difference with no 
solution. Neither interventions that ignore differences nor those that focus on them are reliably 
effective, as both can reproduce the very disparities they aim to eliminate. An alternative 
intervention strategy, one that both ignores and focuses on differences, holds promise. This 
strategy involves identifying features of the organization’s culture—its structures, practices, 
norms, and patterns of interaction—that undermine its aspirational vision and, at the same time, 
are on the critical path to employee thriving and success; changing those features in ways that 
advance the vision and also reduce disparities in employee thriving and success; and monitoring 
outcomes to ensure the intervention has its intended effects without reproducing disparities.301   
Another important reframing strategy involves moving across levels of analysis and the 
locus of decision making. Paradox theory could usefully inform the work of the scholars that 
have been seeking to expand beyond a court-centric approach to legal education, including 
experimentalists, feminist scholars, critical race scholars, and law and society scholars.  
 
b. Dealing with emotions 
Another set of strategies focuses on addressing the emotional reactions evoked by 
paradox, particularly uncertainty and anxiety. This focus acknowledges the importance, often 
under-appreciated, of cultivating students’ capacity to deal with emotions generated by the 
lawyering paradoxes—an aspect of learning that law schools and the legal profession tend to 
discount. Law students and lawyers face a variety of emotional challenges which affect the way 
they make meaning of their roles.  
For example, confronting the gap between one’s sense of justice and justice as defined by 
the court often provokes a range of strong emotions: anger, disgust, hopelessness, anxiety. The 
immediate emotional tendency might be to lash out, reject, withdraw, or defend. The paradox 
framework suggests that, rather than avoid or delegitimate those emotional reactions, the 
capacity to act in the face of these contradictions requires the ability to recognize, acknowledge, 
and experience those emotions, and to identify the needs and values that underlie those reactions. 
That skill and capacity is one that can be learned. To be taken seriously by students, that learning 
 
300 Elbow, supra note XX, at 240. 
301 Sturm, supra note , at ; Heidi Brooks, Robin Ely, Lisa Lahey, and Susan Sturm, Organizational Culture Change 
to Advance Workplace Equality, September 14, 2019  (unpublished proposal on file with the author).  
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needs to take place in the context of conventional law school classes, as well as in the contexts 
set up to build proactive lawyering skills. 
A starting point for this capacity is building explicit attention to the skills of listening, 
speaking up, providing feedback, and developing strategy, and focusing explicitly on the process 
of shifting gears from one kind of listening and discourse to another. In a book called 
“Collaborating with the Enemy,” Adam Keohane introduced the idea of stretch collaboration, 
which “gives up the assumption of control.” Stretch collaboration advocates embracing both 
conflict and connection, and “moving toward experimenting systematically with different 
perspectives and possibilities” with the intention of staying “alert and courageous enough to 
make a countervailing move when it is required, to notice and correct dynamic imbalance.”302 
The idea of polarity management introduces a set of practices aimed at enabling people to shift 
focus from background to foreground—a constant process of shifting back and forth from one 
polarity to the other, along with the idea that these competencies take practice to develop.303   
Clinical faculty members have been working with these concepts for decades, and have 
much to others about how to build these competencies in the large law school classroom as well 
as in leadership offerings.304 Basic skills that are the backbone of clinical teaching, such as 
empathetic listening, developing mindfulness practice, cultivating empathy, interacting across 
difference, cultural competency, and practicing nonviolent communication, provide a strong 
foundation for a systematic practice of navigating paradox. Habits of mind developed, for 
example, to develop cultural competency also cultivate students’ capacity to sit with difference, 
understand its impact, and explore ways to make it a source of productive tension rather than 
stereotyping and disconnection.305 Particularly when these practices are linked to areas that 
students view as core to their roles as lawyers—such as learning doctrine, participating in moot 
court, navigating performance in an adversary setting, undertaking a major social change 
initiative, or doing deals—these practices provide a concrete setting for learning how to sit with 
intellectual and emotional discomfort, uncertainty, and conflicting feelings and practices, while 
also engaging in conventional legal reasoning.  
Paradox scholars and practitioners have offered some promising directions for 
experimentation with the development of the capacities needed to hold this complexity.306 The 
Immunity to Change framework developed by Lisa Lahey and Robert Kegan offers a practice, 
starting with oneself, for building by creating opportunities to experience and learn from optimal 
conflict, which they define as: 
• The persistent experience of some frustration, dilemma, life puzzle, quandary, or personal 
problem that is . . . 
• Perfectly designed to cause us to feel the limits of our current way of knowing. . . 
 
302 JOHNSON, supra note , at.  
303 Id. 
304 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note ;  
305 Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001). 
306 ADAM KEOHANE, COLLABORATING WITH THE ENEMY: HOW TO WORK WITH PEOPLE YOU DON'T AGREE WITH OR 
LIKE OR TRUST  9 (2017).  
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• In some sphere that we care about, with . . .  
• Sufficient supports so that we are neither overwhelmed by the conflict nor able to escape 
or diffuse it.307  
 
I been struck by the power of the Immunity to Change framework, which I employed in both 
Lawyer Leadership and Lawyering for Change, to build students’ capacity to take risks, hold 
complexity, and deal with contradictory yet interdependent goals and patterns. By inviting and 
enabling students to push themselves, reflect, and link these capacities to their core aspirations as 
lawyers, law schools can cultivate the capacity to hold paradox. 
 
c. Holding both fixed and growth mindsets 
Navigating lawyering paradoxes also requires the capacity to hold competing mindsets, to 
manage a fraught relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and to build 
relationships of trust with people that you also compete with or don’t fully trust. Some aspects of 
this tension stem from policy choices (such as the curve, the timing of on campus interviewing 
by law firms, and law schools’ preoccupation with US News and World Report Ratings) which 
could and should be changed to better support the capacity to navigate paradox.  
In the meantime, there is much to be learned from innovators who have found ways to 
support students’ development of a growth mindset alongside a culture of competition, and to 
value intrinsic markers of meaning even as students grab for the gold rings. Again, Professor 
Elizabeth Emens’ practice is instructive. A visiting scholar who observed Professor Emens class 
described the strategies that she put into place that enabled students both to push themselves and 
to support each other, to experiment and fail while experiencing this process as part of their 
learning:   
You facilitated our learning through a wide range of legal and non-legal materials as well 
as experiential exercises—most of which were totally new to me—that appealed to a 
wide range of personalities and practice types. Quite deliberately, it seemed, you 
refrained from “evaluating” the students' engagement in the course by inserting your own 
personal views . . . unless it was absolutely necessary to make intellectual connections or 
steer the class in a productive direction. This is one of the reasons that I described your 
pedagogy as "democratic," as well. While you were clearly our teacher and guide through 
the course materials, I really appreciated that you made efforts to equalize the 
traditionally hierarchical relationship between a law professor and her students as much 
as possible. Likewise, you tried to ensure relatively equal speaking time between students 
in order to promote a non-hierarchical learning space without domination by anyone, 
whether professor or student. Form mirrored content here. You were personally 
modelling (or appearing to model) best practices of mindfulness to the extent that you 
 
307 KEGAN AND LAHEY, supra note, at 54. 
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tried to facilitate more open, creative, and non-judgmental awareness among students as a 
fellow contemplative practitioner in the classroom.308 
 
d. Pursuing justice through lawyering in the face of law’s injustice 
 It is not enough to engage in critique of judicial doctrine or to bemoan the politicization 
of the federal judiciary. To stave off cynicism and sustain engagement in pursuing justice, 
students require the opportunity to exercise concrete ways that lawyers can pursue both types of 
justice—both in and out of court.  
The paradox framework can be helpful here. When a contradiction emerges between our 
conception of justice and that contained in more traditional legal processes, how do we 
understand that contradiction? How might we reconceive the meaning of authority, the locus of 
decision-making, the participants in the process, to enable a process of imagination operating 
alongside legality? To what extent can and should that process connect directly to law’s more 
formal practices of legality? Where and how else do lawyers, courts, agencies, and legal actors 
address these problems? What does this kind of problem solving and norm generation look like? 
Who participates in it? How is it supported or undermined by conventional forms of legality? 
Should these forms of proactive lawyering push us to redesign our understanding of the meaning 
of courts and legality, or should they operate separately? How will they affect each other?  
 Serious engagement with these questions will require more capacious materials, forms of 
pedagogy, and relationships, but conventional teaching can pave the way for those more 
fundamental changes. Positive deviants in our midst have already begun that work. The question 
is how can we take these experiments in the margins and bring them to the center of legal 
education, while maintaining the widely shared commitment to honing methodological doubt. 
 
C. Designing for Paradox 
The strategies discussed thus far target individual faculty members and students, who can put 
those strategies into use without major change in the law school environment. Those local efforts 
matter. They enable enterprising faculty and students to cultivate the capacity to navigate 
paradox without the kind of culture change that is both so necessary and difficult to achieve in 
law schools. But without a change in the larger context, these experiments will remain marginal, 
and many students are likely to continue to find themselves stuck in counter-productive 
contradictions rather than dynamic tensions. 
For these spaces to take root and produce sustainable change, innovation must operate on 
multiple levels simultaneously, and across different time horizons. Individual students, faculty, 
and lawyers require strategies that will enable them to navigate these tensions from the time they 
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enter law school. Teachers require frameworks, strategies, and tools that they can use in the 
classroom and in programs operating within a culture organized around legality. Institutions and 
their leadership require ways to push toward transformative change, in an environment that 
resists change and where the commitments to the status quo are deeply rooted.  
The paradox literature offers a third overall approach that could help break out of this 
pattern—designing for paradox. This step means building the environments and structures, and 
“choice architecture” that will facilitate productive engagement with the contradictions and 
connections between legality and proactive lawyering as part of solving problems.309 For this to 
take hold, it has to bring proactive lawyering from the margins to the center of legal education 
and culture, and to connect to the sites and incentives that form students’ identities as lawyers.  
This sounds daunting, but it need not proceed top down and whole hog. Experimentation 
will be key to moving this strategy forward, as the paradox literature would predict. Scholarship 
that models the use of design as a way to integrate legality and proactive lawyering provides a 
jumping off point.310 Courses and programs that support an integrated experience for law 
students offers one form of experimentation. A recent white paper called Re-Envisioning 
Professional Education describes several initiatives underway that are experimenting with 
building these kinds of learning environments, including at Northwestern and Stanford Law 
Schools.311 The Davis Polk Leadership fellowships and innovation grants recently launched at 
Columbia Law School offer another example of this kind of experimentation. Linking 
experiential learning with classes focused on developing traditional legal skills.  
Another strategy involves building cohorts of students, faculty, staff, and312 lawyers who 
are engaged in this kind of learning and practice, linking them with each other, and identifying 
core examples in the law school.313 Courses and research that rely on collaboration as the way to 
develop legal skills could include modules that equip students to collaborate, and thus enhance 
both lawyering and leadership capacities. The institution might create incentives for people in 
different roles and with different skills and orientations to collaborate, and build those 
collaborations into spaces where legality and leadership both operate. Long term sustainability 
and impact depends upon linking these innovations to core activities that define the culture and 
values of the law school and the legal profession.  
Experimentation has the virtue of proceeding initially without requiring wholesale change 
at the outset, allowing learning to take place, building communities of practice interested in 
learning with and from each other, and laying the foundation for the kind of learning required to 
hold paradox. Support from law school leadership, however, is key to sustaining these 
 
309 See Underhill, supra note XX; Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note XX; Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (1987). 
310 See, e,g, Hagen, supra note XX. 
311 Austin, Chu, and Liebman, supra note, at 15-16.  
312 Columbia Law School, Davis Polk Leadership Initiative, https://www.law.columbia.edu/about/dean-
welcome/about-dean/leadership-initiative-columbia-law-school.  
313 CUNY modeled this strategy at the institutional level by introducing “houses” as a core building block of 
learning—groups of approximately 20 students who worked through problems with a faculty member, who acted as 
a senior lawyer—one with time and commitment to teach their juniors. Lesnick, supra note , at 1187. 
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experiments and building them into the fabric of the institutions. Doing this work can feel 
emotionally draining and somewhat risky for students, faculty, and lawyers, but remains critical 
to being able to meet the challenges that face law students and the legal profession. Their success 
depends upon opportunities for thoughtful experimentation, supported by environments that 
make it possible to fail and recover. This kind of support enables the creation of routines and 
forums where conflict and cooperation can operate together or in tandem—another strategy that 
has some support from the paradox literature.314  
 
CONCLUSION 
The paradox idea affords a way to move forward in the face of daunting challenges 
facing law schools and the legal profession. I do not mean to suggest that the ills of legal 
education and the legal profession can be cured by learning how to navigate lawyering 
paradoxes. Many scholars and commentators have documented structural problems that 
contribute to students’ disengagement and mission drift; the failure to provide access to justice 
for those without wherewithal to pay for a lawyer, the unhappiness of lawyers, and the low level 
of trust and legitimacy in the legal system are just a few.  
What the paradox idea does is provide a way to start small and think big. In the process 
of building the capacity to hold paradox, the potential lies to enable lawyers to reimagine 
institutions while operating within them. These pockets of innovation hold potential as 
fractiles—“infinitely complex patterns that are self-similar across different scales. They are 
created by repeating a simple process over and over in an ongoing feedback loop.”315 This is the 
mirror image of Howard Lesnick’s brilliant use of William Blake’s metaphor of infinity in the 
grain of sand.316  
The paradox idea, with its emphasis on holding unresolved tensions and experimenting, 
invites the conscious construction of spaces that can hold legality and proactive lawyering, and 
link this multiple consciousness to the pursuit of justice. It also builds the capacities needed to 
address the intractable problems and deep polarization facing the world. Linked to each other 
and made visible, these experiments hold promise as a launchpad for law schools to equip law 
students and the profession to make meaning of the contradictions built into law. This is what is 
necessary to realize law’s promise. 
 
314 HALL, supra note, at 733 
315 ADRIENNE MAREE BROWN, EMERGENT STRATEGY  51 (2017).  
316 This poem, quoted by Lesnick, has become an organizing frame for thinking about multi-level change: 
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower 
Hold Inifinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour. 
 
William Blake, Auguries of Innocence, in WILLIAM BLAKE: POETRY AND DESIGNS 209 (M. Johnson & J. Grant eds 
1979). 
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